TIGLATH PILESER III
COLUMBIA
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CONTRIBUTIONS TO ORIENTAL HISTORY
AND PHILOLOGY
No. V.
TIGLATH PILESER III
B
IK
ABRAHAM S;>'ANSPACHER, Ph.D.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
1912
All rights reserved
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NOTE
The following thesis by Dr. A. S. Anspacher gives the
most succinct account of the reign of Tiglath Pileser III
which has yet been attempted. The author has systemat-
ically endeavored to place a number of localities, men-
tioned in the documents of this great Assyrian king, and
in so doing he has made a distinct contribution to ancient
geography. Tiglath Pileser's map has always been some-
what uncertain, and, in his work, Dr. 'Anspacher has
succeeded not only in establishing several new locations,
but he has traced, more carefully than has been done
hitherto, the routes of march of the principal campaigns
inaugurated by this notable conqueror.
In compiling the tale of an ancient nation, it is neces-
sary to specialize on the material of each period, and also
on that of each important reign ; and this is what Dr.
Anspacher has done. While it is true that all the riddles
of the history of a vanished people can never be satisfac-
torily solved, a careful study, such as this dissertation
undoubtedly is, cannot fail to be of value to the historian.
J. DYNELEY PRINCE.
Columbia Uniterbitt,
New York Citt.
DEDICATED TO MY WIFE
BERTHA F. ANSPACHER
AS AN APPRECIATION OF THAT HEROIC SELF-SACRIFICINO
AID, WHICH TOGETHER WITH HER UNSELFISH
DEVOTION, MAKES LIFE'S TRIALS SACRED
AND TO
MR. JOHN TROUNSTINE
WHO WILL REALIZE THE SENTIMENTS WHICH CAUSE THK
AUTHOR TO COUPLE HIS NAME WITH THAT OF HIS
NIECE IN THIS NOTE OF SINCERE
GRATITUDE
INTRODUCTION
The attempt to solve all the problems connected with
the life and history of Tiglath Pileser III can never be
fully successful as long as we remain without new in-
scriptional material by means of which to fill in the
lacunae which so unfortunately abound in the existing
tablets. With but one exception, all the inscriptions
which we now possess were found by Layard in the South-
west Palace of Nimrod. Some of the tablets came
originally from the Northwest, some from the Central
Palace ; and since all three of the mounds which mark
the sites of these three palaces have been thoroughly
explored, it is perhaps too much to hope that more records
of Tiglath Pileser's reign will come down to us.
This thesis is an attempt to fix in some detail the prin-
cipal facts in the history of Tiglath Pileser III. Although
every standard work on Assyrian history has some pages
devoted to this theme, no author has treated it with such
detail as to present the full story. The entire subject
has appealed to me as one deserving far more considera-
tion than is usually accorded to it in the histories. The
reign of Tiglath Pileser III was from one point of view
the most important in Assyrian history, and the revolu-
tionary tendencies which characterized it are of as much
importance to civilization as they were to the then welfare
of Assyria itself. It needed a revolution to make the
X INTRODUCTION
conservative Assyrian politicians of the time realize that
the very existence of the state was in danger. To curtail
the immense revenues of the priests so that sufi&cient
means to carry on the extensive military operations always
necessary to Assyria's safety might never be lacking was
the immediate aim of the revolution. That result it
speedily achieved. But from the viewpoint of world
history it also accomplished a far more valuable work,
in that it gave Tiglath Pileser the opportunity so to shape
Assyria's policies as to give her a longer lease of life than
would otherwise have been hers.
When Tiglath Pileser III came to the throne, Assyria
was already beginning to succumb to the forces of decay.
Her dependencies were being gradually taken from her,
and her armies were meeting frequent reverses. It
needed a great warrior and statesman to save her, not
only for herself, but for the accomplishment of her cul-
tural work. The value of this king to civilization, there-
fore, lies not in the fact of his extensive conquests
themselves, but rather in the fact that without him
Assyria would not have endured long enough to bequeath
anything to the world.
The proper fixing of the geographical locations men-
tioned in the inscriptions is of prime importance. I have,
wherever possible, tried to determine these and also the
routes of march by the aid of all the historical inscrip-
tions that were available to me, and believe that I have
fixed some of these with exactness. One fact I wish to
note here. At first thought it would seem that the Arabic
geographers should yield material for the determination
of some of the localities in question, but on the contrary
no such aid is forthcoming. They deal with a later
INTRODUCTION
XI
period of the history of Western Asia, and only a very
few of the geographical names of the times of which they
treat preserve even a reminiscence of old Assyrian nomen-
clature.
In conclusion I wish to thank Professor Prince, under
whom I have studied my major subject, Assyriology, and
whose aid and suggestion as well as able instruction have
given to my work whatever value it may possess.
To Professor Richard Gottheil I also owe a debt of
gratitude for many helpful suggestions, and have much
pleasure in expressing my appreciation and gratitude.
ABRAHAM S. ANSPACHER.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAOl
I. The Sources 1
II. Accession * . . .10
III. The Southern and Western Frontiers ... 18
IV. Syria and the West 32
V. Media and Urartu 54
VI. The Conquest of Babylonia 64
xui
PRINCIPAL ABBREVIATIONS
Assy. Can. . . . G. Smith, Assyrian Eponym Canon, 1869.
Disc G. Smith, Assyrian Discoveries, 1875.
Br Rudolph E. Briinnow, Classified List, 1889.
Kost Paul Rost, Die Keilschrifttexte Tiglat-Pileser's III.
Band I : Einleitung, Transcription und Ueberset-
zung, Worterverzeichniss mitCommentar. Band 11 :
Autograph ierte Texte, 1893.
Ann. Annals: in Rost, Band I. pp. 2 ff.
Th. A Die Thontafelinschrift, obverse ; in Rost, Band I.
pp. 55-69.
Th. R Die Thontafelinschrift, reverse ; in Rost, Band I.
pp. 70-77.
PI. I Platteninschrift von Nimrud, No. I ; in Rost, Band I.
pp. 42-47.
PI. II. . c . . . Platteninschrift von Nimrud, No. II ; in Rost, Band I.
pp. 48-53.
Kl. I Kleinere Inschrif ten ; in Rost, Band I. pp. 78-83.
Kl. II Kleinere Inschriften ; in Rost, Band I. pp. 84-85.
KAT.2 Schrader, Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament,
2d ed., 1883.
KB Schrader, Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek, Vols. I-IV.
KGF Schrader, Keilinschriften und Geschichtsforschung,
1878.
Kritik Schrader, Zur Kritik der Inschriften Tiglath-Pileser's
11, des Asarhaddon \ind des Ashurbanipal, 1879.
Forsch Winckler, Altorieutalische Forschungen.
Untersuchgn. . Winckler, Untersuchungen zur altorieutalische Ge-
schichte, 1889.
Lay Layard Inscriptions in the Cuneiform Character, 1851.
XV
Xvi PRINCIPAL ABBREVIATIONS
Paradies. . . . Delitzsch, Wo lag das Paradies ? 1881.
Sulm Billerbeck, Das Sandschak Suleimania, 1898.
R Rawlinson, Cuneiform Inscriptions of Western Asia.
RP Records of the Past.
PSBA Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archaeology.
ZA Zeitschrift fiir Assyriologie.
JRAS Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
TIGLATH PILESER III
CHAPTER I
THE SOURCES
From the time of the destruction of the Babylonian
Empire until the middle of the last century, when Layard
began his excavations, Tiglath Pileser IIP was known
only because of the mention of his name in a few Biblical
verses. 2 Nothing was certain about him,, except that a
king of that name had ruled in Assyria and had made his
power felt in Palestine. All knowledge of his history
had passed from human memory, and even the inscrip-
tions which finally proved to be his, when they were
unearthed and deciphered, presented many a puzzling
problem. The mutilated condition in which the tablets
were found did not, at the time, promise much for a
future solution of the difficulties ; besides which, one
of the tablets — the longest inscription — was so badly
cracked and broken in shipment to the British Museum
that many attempts to correct the first faulty piecing
together were for a lonor time unsuccessful. When this
1 Schrader, KAT.- p. 240 and note, reads the name "Tu-kul-ti
(Tuk-lat)-habal-i-sarra'' ; he translates, "Trust (i.e. Object of Trust) ia
the Son of the'Sarra Temple." Note ABK. p. 148, No. 9, and p. 151 :
the "Son of the Sarra Temple is the God Adar" ; the basic meaning
of the name, therefore, is " Ti'ust is Adar."
2 2 K. XV. 29 and xv. 7 ; 1 Chr. v. 6, 26; 2 Chr. ixviii. 20. The
form Tiglath Pilneser in Chronicles is due to "an accidental corruption
of the familiar name at the hands of the Chronicler or of his Midrashic
source." (Kittel, Chron. Heb. SBOT. 68.) He was known as Tiglath
1
2 TIGLATH PILESER III
had finally been accomplished, it was discovered that
about a hundred lines were missing altogether.
When Layai'd had in the course of his excavations
reached what he afterwards called " the Southwest Pal-
ace of Nimrod," he found that the whole interior of one of
the large halls remained "fairly intact,"^ and that it was
panelled with slabs brought from elsewhere. Some of the
slabs came originally from the Northwest, some from the
Central Palace. " The bas-reliefs always, when left entire,
turned toward the wall of sun-dried brick, . . . and
upon the faces of most of the slabs forming wall E were
the marks of a chisel; . . . the bas-reliefs had been
purposely destroyed. Only parts of the wall F had been
finished. Many of the slabs not having been used and
still lying in the centre of the chamber, ... it was evi-
dent that these were entire, having only suffered from fire.
They were, moreover, arranged in rows with great regu-
larity, and, in one or two instances, heaped the one above
the other."
The analysis of these inscriptions, at whose interpreta-
tion several partial attempts were made before Schrader's
authoritative work, was all rendered secondary by that
scholar's investigation.^ Schrader divided the inscrip-
tions into Annals and the so-called Prunkinschriften : the
Pileser n, until, in 1886, Th. G. Pinches, in "Guide to the Kouyunjik
Gallery," p. 9, No. 72, described an inscription of Ramman-Nirari II,
which showed that a grandfather of that king was also called Tiglath
Pileser. This is the second king of the name, and our king is, therefore,
the third. Winckler published the inscription in KB.^ pp. 48-49, and
in ZA. II. p. 311.
3 "Nineveh and its Remains," vol. II. pp. 27 ff.
* Zur Kritik der Inschriften Tiglath Pileser' s II, des Asarhaddon und
des Asurhanipal, in Kong. Akadetnie der Wissenschaft zu Berlin, 1879.
A description of all the inscriptions published up to 1886 is given in
THE SOURCES 3
last being arranged not chronologically, but geograpliically.
Both have been published, transliterated, and translated
in part, by many scholars. Schrader divides the Annals
into those composed of 7, 12, and 16 lines, respectively.
Of the seven-line inscriptions (seven in number), Layard
published five.^ They are those which in his collection
are designated as 69, A, 1 ; 69, A, 2 ; 69, B, 1 ; 69, B, 2;
and 34, B. The last was translated by Smith,^ and the
remaining two inscriptions of this set were published by
the same author.'^ The second group is made up of twelve-
line inscriptions, although one. Lay. 45, B, in its present
condition contains only eight lines, the first four being
broken away. Another, III R 9, No. 1,^ is so badly muti-
lated that not a single line remains intact. Lay. 50, A
(III R 9, No. 3, p. 41-52) is in a very fair condition and
is continued in Lay. 50, B, and Lay. 67, A ; both these last
being written on one stone ; while Lay. 67, B, is a con-
tinuation of Lay. 67, A ; making of the four inscriptions
a complete sub-group. Lay. 51, A, and 51, B,^ are writ-
ten on tablets the last half of which is entirely broken
away, but what remains is perfectly legible ; Lay. 51, B,
being damaged to the extent of only a small lacuna in
the last line. Lay. 52, A, and Lay. 52, B,io are fairly
well preserved and form a continuous narrative. ^^ The
Bezold, Kurzgefasster Vberblick iiber die Babylonisch-Assyrische Litera-
tiir. (Leipzig, 1886.)
s " Inscriptions in the Cuneiform Character,"' 1851.
6 Disc. pp. 266 ff.
T In III R 10, No. 1, o and b. He translated them in Disc. pp. 281 ff.
8 Translated by Smith, Disc. pp. 274 fl.
9 Translated in Disc. pp. 269 ff.
10 Translated in Smith, Disc. pp. 267 ff.
11 This group also includes two fragments, Lay. 19, B. and Lay. 29. V, :
the last was translated by Smith, Disc. pp. 283 ff.
4 TIGLATH PILESER III
third group (16 lines), is made up of inscriptions which
are badly mutilated ; viz. Lay. 71, B, which is continued
in Lay. 73, A,^ the merest fragment. Only about a third
of the original tablet has come down to us. Lay. 71, A
is scarcely in a better condition, and is continued on the
same stone by Lay. 71, B. The two inscriptions are
separated by a perpendicular line through the width of
the stone, so that Lay. 71, B, line 1, is the continuation
of Lay. 71, A, line 16.
There remain a few Annal Inscriptions which cannot
be classified by the number of their lines : viz. III. R. 9,
No. 2 ; a fragmentary 19 line tablet ; ^'^ III. R. 9, No. 3,
lines 22—41 (Lay. 65), a 20 line inscription ; i* the very
badly broken 18 line tablet, Lay. 66 ; i^ m. R. 10, No. 2,
consisting of the broken parts of an originally 47 line
inscription,!^ and III. R. 10, No. 3, composed of 24 lines.
Schrader's second division, the Pru7iJcinschrif ten, includes
a long fragment of a tablet which was inscribed on both
sides, the middle portion (about 50 lines on the obverse,
and 50 on the reverse, i.e. about 100 in all), being missing.
It was published II. R. 67 ; and translated by Smith,!^
Eneberg,!^ and S. Arthur Strong.i^ The duplicate of this
'12 Translated by Schrader, KAT.^ pp. 261 ff.; and Smith, Disc. pp.
282 ff.
13 Translated by Smith, Disc. pp. 275 ff. ; Kodwell, BP. V. p. 45 ; and
Schrader, KAT.^ pp. 217 ff.
1* Translated by Smith, Disc. pp. 276 ff.; Menant, Annates, p. 146 ; and
Eodwell, BP. V. pp. 46 ff.
15 Translated by Smith, Disc. pp. 285 ff.
16 Translated by Schrader, KAT.^ pp. 225 ff.; Eodwell, BP. V. pp.
61 ff.; and by Smith, Disc. p. 284.
IT Disc. pp. 256 ff.
18 Journ. Asiatique, VI, pp. 441 ff.; cf. KAT.^ p. 224, lines 23-28, and
p. 257, lines 57-62.
" BP. V. pp. 115 ff.
THE SOURCES 5
inscription (Brit. Mus. D. T. 30) is of special interest,
having been found by Smith at Kalah in the Temple of
Nimroud, and is apparently a Babylonian copy.* It was
published by Schrader,^! and translated by Smith. 22
Lay. 17, F, is a 36 line tablet, translated by Schrader,^^
Menant,2* and Oppert.^s In 1893 P. Rost supplied the
need of a complete edition of all the inscriptions, with a
new set of autographs, a transliteration, and translation.^
In it he publishes for the first time three small tablets.^
He was fortunate enough to discover a squeeze of Lay.
17/18 ; which was made before the tablet was broken.
To what kings these mutilated sculptures and tablets
belonged was for a long time a puzzling question. Layard
himself,^ having compared them with a pavement slab of
the same period and with reliefs of the Central Palace,
concluded that they all belonged to the same king. After
Hincks^Q had deciphered on one of the reliefs the name
of Menahem, king of Israel, as a tributary to the Assyrian
king in the eighth year of the latter's reign, on the basis
of a reference to 2 K. xv. 19 and 20, and 1 Chr. v. 26,
Layard concluded that this king must be " an immediate
predecessor of Pul, Pul himself, or Tiglath Pileser."
With the discovery of the Eponym Canon the possibility
20 Rost, vol. I. p. 11.
21 Kdng. Ak. d. Wiss. 1879.
22 Disc. pp. 254 ff.
23 Lines 20-25 in EGF. p. 20G, and lines 4-10 in KGF. p. 106.
24 Annales, pp. 138 ff.
25 Expedition des Bois d'Assyrie, p. 336.
26 Keilschrifttexte Tiglat-Pileser' s III in two volumes. All references
to the inscriptions hereafter are to this work.
27 Vol. II. p. 15, PI. No. 24, and Kuj. Gallery, No. 66 and No. 04 ; also
K 2469.
28 " Disc, in Nineveh and Babylon," p. 617.
29 Athenaeum, June 3, 1852.
6 TIGLATH PILESER III
of this king being an immediate predecessor of Pul was
obviated. But on the other hand, the difficulty was not
lightened, because Pul is mentioned in 2 K. xv. 19, as
the conqueror of Menahem, and again, together with
Tiglath Pileser in 1 Chr. v. 26. He was not recorded
in any Assyrian inscriptions, and, of course, not in the
Eponym Canon. It would have been easy to have as-
cribed the tablets to Tiglath Pileser without further
debate. But although no name was found upon what
afterwards turned out to be the mutilated Annal Inscrip-
tions of the king in question,^^ yet to have thus arbitrarily
assigned them to Tiglath Pileser still left the question of
the identity of Pul undecided.
George Smith ^^ conjectured that Pul was, . . . "either,
Vul-Nirari III, who might still have been reigning in 772,
or a monarch immediately succeeding Ashurdan II or
III, or that Pul and Tiglath Pileser are identical." This
last theory had already been propounded by Sir Henry
Rawlinson,32 ^nd independently by R. Lepsius.^ It was
finally established as the correct one by Schrader.^ We
may add here what is the clinching proof. In one of the
Babylonian King Lists,^ we read, Col. iv : ^
3^ Lay. 17 and 18, and II. R. 67 are not Annals.
31 " The Assyr. Ep. Can.," p. 76. Smith still placed some faith in the
Ussher Chronology, according to which Menahem began to rule in 773-
772. Then, of course, Vul-Nirari (Ramman-Nirari) would have to
reign until 772. Smith himself inclines to the identity of Pul and Tiglath
Pileser.
32 H. Rawlinson in G. Rawlinson's Herodotus, 1862, I., p. 382; and
AthencEum, Aug. 22, 1869, p. 24-5.
3-^ IJber d. Chronologischen Wei-th d. Assy. Eponymen, 1869, p. 56 ; also
Schrader, KAT:^ p. 227, and KGF. pp. 442 ff.
^ KAT:^p. 227.
35 Pinches, PSBA. May 6, 1894.
3s Translated, Sayce in BP. New Series, I, pp. 18 and 23.
THE SOURCES 7
line 5. Nahu-mm-ukin his son for one month and 12
days.
line 6. The 31 (years) of the dynasty of Babylon.
line 7. Ukin-zira of the dynasty of Sasi for three
years.
line 8. Pulu for 2 (years).
Compare this with the Babylonian Chronicle,^" Col. 1.*
line 17. For 2 months and . . . days Suma-ukin reigned
over Babylon.
line 18. Ukin-zira seized upon the throne.
line 19. In the 3d year of Ukin-zira, Tiglath Pileser.
line 20. When he had descended into the country of
Akkad.
line 21. Destroyed Bit-Ammukani and captured Ukin-
zira.^
line 22. For three years Ukin-zira reigned over Babylon.
line 23. Tiglath. Pileser sat upon the throne of Babylon.
A comparison of lines 7 and 8 of the first inscription with
lines 17 ff. of the second proves conclusively the identity
of Tiglath Pileser and Pul, showing that the impartial
Babylonian historian gave him the respective names he
bore in both Assyria and Babylon.^^
All this is in perfect accord with the entry in the Ptole-
maean Canon,^ which notes for the year 731, the year in
which Tiglath Pileser was crowned in Babylon, " Chinzi-
ru8 and Porus.'' This is, of course, the Ukin-zira and the
Pulu of the Babylonian King Lists; Porus being a Persian
3" Winckler in ZA. II. 23.
83 Th. A. 23, where the name is Ukimir.
89 Similar changes of name are the following : Shalmaneser IV and
Ashurbanipal are in the Babylonian King Lists called Ululai and Kandulu
respectively. For comment, see Winckler, Geschichte, p. 221, u.
*o See Smith, "Assy. Eponym Canon," p. 102.
8 TIGLATH PILESER III
corruption of Pul.'^ The fact that Berosus ^ makes Pulus,
" Bex Chaldaeorum,'' is in agreement with the above evi-
dence. It simply means that Tiglath Pileser III came to
the throne of Babylon only after having conquered Ukin-
zira, head of the Bit-AmukJcani, a powerful Chaldean
tribe. Finally, Schrader^^ settled for all time that all the
inscriptions belong to Tiglath Pileser.
There is in all these sources of Tiglath Pileser's reign
scarcely any specific reason for doubt as to the accuracy
and trustworthiness of the reports which they give us.
We have not, for instance, as is the case with Sargon,^
any variant records and versions of the inscriptions; and
while they are, of course, subject to such doubt as always
attaches to the official records of a time which so far lacks
the historical sense and the morale of the scientific historian,
as to glorify a king or a nation at the expense of exact
truth, still, we find no contradictory testimony in them.
Even the figures in the records of captives and of tribute
furnish scant reason for doubt.
If we possessed contemporaneous documents from other
nations to control the official records, there could be no
hesitancy in using them to check the inscriptions, but in
the one instance where we do possess such a contempora-
neous inscription, an inscription mentioning the name of
Tiglath Pileser,^ the latter's reports are confirmed. And
this is also true of the Biblical references to him. The
" KAT.^ p. 238, and Pinches, PSBA. 1883-84, pp. 190 ff.
*2 Polyhistor ap. Eusb. Chrn. I. 4.
*' Kritik, pp. 10 fl. Although previously he had denied the identity of
TP. and Pul, in ZDMQ. XXV, p. 453.
" Olmstead, " Sargon of Assyria," p. 7.
<s Published by Eduard Sachau, in Mitthl. aus d. Orientalischen
Sammlungen, Kong. Mus. zu Berlin, Heft XI. p. 55.
THE SOURCES 9
clues given us in the Eponym Canon, the Assyrian Chron-
icle, the Ptolemaean Canon, the Babylonian Chronicle,
and the Babylonian King Lists, refer, of course, mainly to
the fixing of dates, and in the case of Tiglath Pileser at
least, confirm each other, although they are independent
witnesses.
The reign of Tiglath Pileser III is especially important,
because with him began a new era in Assyrian history.
This king prepared the way for that period of his country's
progress in which Assyria attained her greatest territorial
extent. Perhaps in his time it was not yet evident that
Assyria was too small a nation to hold her own against
the half civilized hordes which later on accomplished her
downfall. The fact that Assyria remained intact long
enough to establish much which has become valuable and
even essential to civilization and culture is in no small
degree a credit due to this great warrior, who founded a
well organized Empire upon foundations which his prede-
cessors had enfeebled, and who was a personality great
enough to have dominated his day. This was so not only
because the times into which he was born invited revolu-
tion and change, but because his own power as warrior,
statesman, and organizer, forced even the priesthood, al-
ways a tremendous influence, to bow to his energy and
will. A great pity it is that his " literary remains " fell
prey not only to the ravages of time and accident, but
also to the desecrating hand of one of his great successors,
Esarhaddon, who wilfully mishandled the records of
Tiglath Pileser and is mainly responsible for the sadly
mutilated condition in which they have come down to us.
CHAPTER II
ACCESSION
The Eponym Canon for the year 745 announces that
on the 12th day of Airu, Tiglath Pileser III ascended the
throne of Assyria. Because of the entry for the previous
year 746, " rebellion in Kalah,'' it has been assumed that
his accession was due to a military revolution, and every
known fact tends to corroborate that view. Certain it is
that Tiglath Pileser only gained the throne because of
the condition of Assyrian affairs, and not because he was
the legitimate successor to the royal office. The Empire
was in very deep trouble. Its prestige was at low ebb.
Abroad its influence was fast waning, and at home all the
elements of a vast political upheaval had for some time
been steadily tending toward revolution. The land was
priestridden. Its wealth swelled the coffers of the temple
treasuries, and its soldiers nourishing the traditions of
ancient prowess had to be content with feeding upon the
memories of former national glory. There was crying
need for a leader of real ability. The land was not a
victim of natural impoverishment. There were means
sufficient for all purposes of national aggrandizement,
could but the man be found who possessed the requisite
qualities of leadership, the man who could compel the
greedy priesthood to relinquish its hold upon those re-
sources which it had come to look upon as rightful and
legitimate prey. The people and the army demanded a
10
ACCESSION 11
sufficient portion of the national income to defray the
cost of military and civil affairs.
It must have been a sad reflection for the Assyrian
soldier to review the fortunes of his country for about a
century before the year 745. Persistently and steadily
ancient foes were encroaching upon Assyrian territory.
The mother country was still intact, but on every hand
the buffer states which great conquerors had been at
extreme pains to erect as barriers against invasion, had
thrown off the yoke ; and even worse, powerful raonarchs
of other nations, taking advantage of the lethargy which
had come over Assyria, were conquering lesser peoples
and building empires which in their new greatness boded
ill for Assyria's future. Since 860, when Shalmaneser II
ascended the throne, lasting and effective victory was
seldom with Assyria, although royal scribes, courtier-like,
record a number of military triumphs. With the excep-
tion of Ramman-Nirari III (810-782), no able, vigorous
king had ruled. That king reigned over a vast empire
which stretched from the borders of Elam on the south,
to NaHri and Andia in the north, and as far as the Medi-
terranean on the east.i He was warlike, and only one of
his reign years, the eleventh, was spent at home. Four
campaigns against Rubuskia, and six expeditions to tlie
East, are a proof of the energy which Assyria, under him,
was exerting in its efforts for conquest. Even against
the successor of Hazael of Damascus, who had conquered
and probably ruled over Israel, Amnion, and Philistia, he
ventured to war and probably took Damascus." But dur-
1 IHe sogenannte synchronistische Geschichte in KB.^ pp. 104 ff. is to
be assigned to Ramman-Nirari III; cf. "Winckler, Untersuchung>n, III.
p. 25.
2 Steinplatteninschrift aus Kalah, in KB.^ I. pp. 189 ff., lines &-12.
12 TIGLATH PILESER III
ing his reign he was stoutly opposed by the growing
power of Urartu. Menuas of Urartu took from Assyria
the tribes around Lake Urumia, and annexed large parts
of HuhHskia^ erecting on the rocks of Rowandiz Pass the
steles which record his achievements.^ He drove the
Assyrians from Lake Van,* and got as far East as beyond
the Euphrates, levying taxes on Miletene.^ His son Ar-
gistis continued the work of his mighty father,^ and from
at least one passage of his Annals,'^ we must conclude that
he defeated the Assyrians in a great battle. The year
778 in the Chronological Lists ^ records a campaign against
Urartu. This is the defeat suffered by Shalmaneser at
Sarisadas.^ The years 776 and 774 both record Urartian
campaigns, in both of which Assyria lost ground, i*' Thus
Assyria, under the feeble rule of Shalmaneser, lost her
northern possessions and those of Miletene. In 773 and
772," in order to hold the West, campaigns had to be
undertaken against Damascus and Sadrak^ the former of
which had been thoroughly subdued by Ramman-Nirari
in. There must also have been disturbances in Sj^ria,
for the land of Patin of Ashurbanipal has already in the
time of Tiglath Pileser III become split up into the four
principalities of Unqi, SartCal, Yaudi^ and Patin. Also
against Hatarika, which had become the dominant power
3 Scheil and de Morgan, Stele de Kelichen, in Recueil de Travaux,
Vol. XIV. pp. 153 ff.
* "Inscription of Palu," Sayce, CIV. JBAS. vol. XIV. pp. 658 ff.
6 Op. cit. JRAS. XXIX, A and B.
6 "Annals of Argistis," op. cit. pp. 572-582.
' Op. cit. pp. 558 ff.
8 Cf. EB.^ pp. 210-211, entry for the years 766 and 755.
9 "Annals of Argistis," JRAS. XXIX. p. 693.
10 Op. cit. pp. 602-609.
"iT^.ipp. 210-211.
ACCESSION 13
in Northern Syria, Ashurdan had twice to wage war,"
while in 754 he was engaged with Arpad, which together
with Ratarika had come to share supremacy in Northern
Syria. Thus it will be seen that Assyria was gradually
losing its grip, and the revolt recorded for 740 in Kaluh,
which resulted in the enthroning of Tiglath Pileser III,
by showing the feebleness of his predecessors, only em-
phasized the weakness which had come over Assyria.
Now there was need of a great man, a need which was
supplied in the person of the soldier who, whatever liis
real name was, seized the reins of government and began
his rule, assuming the name of one of Assyria's greatest
conquerors, and becoming Tiglath Pileser III.
The fact that he gained the crown raised the uprising
to the dignified status of a revolution; and it was certainly
anti-priestly in its essential character. So much is evident
from the history of his successors, from Shalmaneser to
Esarhaddon. As long as the tribute of dependencies was
available for military purposes, so long the imposition of
the temple taxes by the priesthood caused no appreciable
fiscal difficulties. Once this source of income became cur-
tailed, the immense revenues of the priesthood must have
loomed large in the eyes of all divisions of secular society.
And these revenues were exempt from the ordinary uses
of the state. The larger cities (these were of priestly
origin) also enjoyed such privileged exemptions that an
anti-priestly movement would be sure to arouse antagonism
from them. Hence a successful revolution certainly did
not receive its inspiration from them. For the country
population, however, and those interested in tliem, it would
^ provide relief. Upon them the burden of taxes fell with
" KB.^ pp. 210-213.
14 TIGLATH PILESER III
impoverishing force as soon as the stream of tribute ceased
to flow into the imperial coffers. This state of affairs
found in Tiglath Pileser the man who knew how to take
advantage of the situation. ^^
His son had in the nature of things to follow the policy
of his father. But, whereas the former could rest his de-
mand for popular approbation upon the success of his
military exploits, and did not have to support his reputa-
tion for anti-priestly feelings on an exaggerated repression
of the priesthood, his son, lacking the glamour of military
achievements, could only prove his loyalty to the forces
which had crowned his father and himself by consistent
antagonism to the priests and the priestly cities. He
went so far as to levy tribute upon the sacred city of
Ashur.i* The statement that Ashur in his anger ^^ gave
the throne of Shalmaneser to Sargon can only mean that
the priestly party, profiting by the feelings of revulsion
which this sacrilege must have caused, regained sufl&cient
power to overthrow the military party. How basic the
conflict between priest and people was can be determined
from the actions of the subsequent kings, Sennacherib,
Esarhaddon, and Ashurbanipal. The first once again
favored the military party,i^ and the last followed in his
footsteps, while Esarhaddon, like Sargon, never failed to
exalt the hierarchy. The affiliations of Tiglath Pileser
in are amply evidenced when we compare his attitude
towards Babylon with that of the two last named kings.
" Cf. Peiser, Skizze der Babylonischen Gesellschaft, in Mittheilungen
d. Vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft, 1896, Heft IV. s. 162-163.
" K. in Winckler's Sammlungen, 11, 1, and translation in Forsch. I.
pp. 403 ff.
15 Op. cit. 34 ff.
16 A'^.i p. 121.
ACCESSION 15
He was as hostile as they were favorable. Esarhacklon
indeed showed his feelings by an act unique in Assyrian
history. In providing materials for the building of his
palace at Kalah, he purposely mutilated and then removed
the sculptures and tablets of Tiglath Pileser from the
Central Palace of Shalmaneser II.
About the ancestry of Tiglath Pileser III we know
little. But despite the fact that he was a usurper, which
may only mean that he was a younger son and not in the
direct line of succession,!^ there is no need to assume that
he was not of royal blood. ^^ In truth he never mentions
his father. But that proves little, for the same is true of
Sennacherib, whose relationship to Sargonr we know only
from the words of Esarhaddon.^^ Nor does Esarhaddon's
desecration of the Central Palace monuments compel us
to deny royal lineage to the usurper. As we have seen,
this can be reasonably explained as Esarhaddon's protest
against the actions of an " impious " king. In fact, there
is good reason to believe that he was the son of Adad-
Nirari IV.^o
" See also Tiele, Qeschichte, p. 226.
18 Rost, vol. I. p. viii, n. 1, makes the scribe (Ann. 31 and Th. A. 26)
merely a flatterer who manufactures a royal ancestry for TP. Such a
view is unnecessary, and, I believe, incorrect. The reference to Ann. 'SI
is a mistake.
19 KB.'^ p. 125, lines -3 and 4, and Prisms A and C.
20 Forsch. Band II, 1905, pp. 356 ff. The usual succession of the kings
preceding TP. is as follows (cf. Tiele, Geschichte, p. 20<j); Kamman-
Nirari III (811-783); Shalmaneser IH (782-773); Ashurdan H (772-
765) ; Ashur-Nirari (754-746). A glance at the Chronological List fully
justifies this order. But two facts are to be noted in connection with it.
First, the line between the years 764 and 763 in the Eponyni Canon.
The presence of this line was usually explained by the notice for 763,
"In the month of Sivan an eclip.se." But this explanation will not
serve, since in all other cases such a line is only found between the begin-
ning of one reign and the close of a preceding one. Secondly, the years
16 TIGLATH PILESER III
The personality of the new ruler can only be drawn in
meagre outline. We have no evidence by means of which
to characterize him, further than to say in the most gen-
eral way that he was brilliant and energetic as a military
leader, and that his natural endowments as a statesman
were fully equal to the demands of the circumstances
surrounding him. That he was far-sighted, his policy
of colonization, which we discuss elsewhere, proves. He
seems to have set a new fashion quite remarkable for an
ancient conqueror, in that no indication of wanton cruelty
can be cited from the inscriptions. As with his successors,
Sargon and Esarhaddon, torture and wholesale slaughter
are limited to occasions where such actions arose out of
imperative need. Nor can he be justly charged with mere
lust for conquest. As an usurper he had of course to
make good his position. But his continuous campaign-
ing, with its accompanying exploitation of foreign ter-
ritory, and the imposition of enormous tribute, arose out
of the needs of the Empire when he came to the throne.
If he had to make extensive conquests for any other reason
763, 762, 761, 760, and 759 all record revolts. Only with 758 does this
state of affairs end with " Peace in the land." Added to this an Arme-
nian inscription (see Belck and Lehmann, Berl. Ak. 1900, p. 118) calls
Ashur-Nirari (the immediate predecessor of TP.) the son of Adad-Nirari.
Was this Adad-Nirari III (810-781)? That is not likely; for, in that
case, Ashur-Nirari (754-746) began to rule twenty-seven years after his
father, and we would have to assume that Shalmaneser III, Ashur-
dan III, and Ashur-Nirari II were brothers. In other words, three suc-
cessive kings were brothers. Certainly an unique occurrence. Winckler's
reconstruction of the succession is probably true to all the facts. The
line between 764 and 763, as do all similar lines in the Canon, denotes
the succession of a new king. The Armenian Inscription referred to
calls Ashur-Nirari the son of Adad-Nirari. Since this cannot be Adad-
Nirari III (812-783), we must postulate for the year 763 a king, Adad-
Nirari IV, who ruled until 754.
ACCESSION 17
than to enlarge the Empire, it was only to secure a steady
inflow of tribute with which to relieve the burdened tiuau-
cial condition of the people. Only in that way could he
verify the contention of the revolutionists, that the cur-
rent poverty was due to the unreasonable exactions of tlie
priesthood. Had the mere lust of conquest animated him,
he would have been an usurper of only the common Ori-
ental type. An examination of the records strongly mili-
tates against such a conclusion. While the Assyrian
chronologists, not being historians in the modern sense,
tell us nothing of the circumstances leading to the revolu-
tion, we are enabled to infer the truth of the situation
from one very significant fact. The first care of an or-
dinary usurper is to secure himself against the claims and
operations of the legitimate heir whom he has displaced.
In the case of Tiglath Pileser III, the party of the natural
heir was the priesthood. Had the demand for a complete
change not been nation-wide, he could not have ventured
to leave his capital shortly after his coronation. Hardly
had six months elapsed, however, i.e. in the first half of
his first regnal year,2i -^hen he went forth upon his initial
campaign. No merely usurping adventurer would have
dared to risk such a move.
21 Rost, vol. I. p. XI. Since he came to the throne after but two months
had elapsed, he reckoned 745 as his first regnal year. As a rule the " ret
iarruW'' denoted the first full calendar year of a king's reign.
CHAPTER III
THE SOUTHERN AND WESTERN FRONTIERS
From the very first it was evident that Tiglath Pileser
had formulated plans to meet the problems which faced
him and his country. So far as mere conquest was con-
cerned many of his predecessors had been eminently suc-
cessful. It was only when the question of organizing
conquered territory and peoples had arisen that they had
failed. Up to Tiglath's Pileser's time, conquest and
revolt succeeded one another with almost unfailing regu-
larity, and the length of time during which most de-
pendencies remained loyal was in direct proportion to the
military capacity of the then ruling king. Tiglath Pileser
planned to make an end of such opportunist allegiance.
He inaugurated a system of colonization designed to make
of the Assyrian Empire a well-regulated and organic
whole, whose farthest possessions would be firmly united
with the imperial country by organic ties. In this
respect Tiglath Pileser was an innovator ; but in the
general plan of conquest which former kings pursued he
could well afford to be an imitator. They had followed a
perfectly natural and reasonable course. The practical
aim of all these monarchs was identical ; viz., on the
south Babylon was to be held as a dependent vassal,
and on the east the tribes which had colonized in Baby-
lonia had to be restrained, lest, obtaining a permanent
18
THE SOUTHERN AND WESTERN FRONTIERS 19
foothold there, they might prove a serious obstacle to
Assyrian expansion in that direction. In the north the
people of Urartu and their natural allies had to be
weakened by the constant embarrassment of battle, lest
by an alliance with the Armenians they should finally
displace Assyria as mistress of the " Four Quarters of the
World." The large stretch of territory on the west which
reached to the Mediterranean contained no single nation
sufficiently powerful to threaten the domination of Assyria,
but the peoples settled in that region were rich in many
products required by Assyria. In the imperial plan these
western lands were destined to furnish a field for terri-
torial expansion, to provide the^ means necessary to keep
Assj^rian finances abreast of its great needs, and to supply
the country with the desired commodities of import. In
full accord with this traditional plan Tiglath Pileser III
undertakes his first campaign against Babylonia, setting
out in September 745. But to think that he moved against
Babylon as an enemy ^ is to miss entirely the statesman-
like insight which he displayed throughout his reign.
Assyria was the suzerain of Babylon ; and it is very
probable that Nabunagir, the Babylonian king, seeing
that an energetic man of ability now ruled at Kalah, was
glad to be able to invoke his aid against the Arameans
and the Chaldeans who were threatening the eastern
and southern borders of Babylonia. Tiglath Pileser's
prompt response to the appeal was not only animated by
1 So Eost, vol. I. p. XIII. Tide also shares this view ; cf. Geschichte,
pp. 217 ff. Against it are Winckler, Hist. pp. 113 ff., and Ilouiiuel,
Geschichte, pp. 051 ff. Rost's claim that TP. took the title of " Kin(/ of
Sumer and Akkad"' from the beginning, does not prove that he went to
Babylon as an enemy. Assyrian suzerainty over Babylon is sufBcient to
account for his assumption of the title.
20 TIGLATH PILESER III
the need of checking these tribes, but also by personal
and political considerations. He was king by right of
revolution, but no religious consecration had legitimized
his accession. In Assyria he could not stoop to receive
such consecration, for the priesthood would not have
accorded it, and the military classes, whose antagonism
to the priesthood had fathered the revolution, would
not have condoned him had he accepted it. To them it
would have appeared that he had secretly compounded
with the Temple interests; but from the Babylonian
priesthood, whose consecration made his rule just as valid
as that of the priests of Assyria, he could and did receive
religious sanction. Nor would they withhold it provided
he consented to come to the aid of their king and country,
threatened as it was by powerful foes on the frontier.
Under their auspices he could offer sacrifices to Bel, Nebo,
Nergal (^Th. A. 11 and 12), to ^arpanit and Tasmit, in
those Babylonian cities which he visited during his first
campaign. Then he could return home as a king whose
coronation had lost the last vestige of illegitimacy be-
cause the gods had accepted his offerings and granted him
victory.
It would also for another reason have served no profit-
able purpose for Tiglath Pileser to play the role of enemy
against Babylon at this time. In his first campaign a
usurper must be victorious. Had he gone forth as the
avowed enemy of Babylon in this campaign, he could not
have claimed a complete victory, unless he had succeeded in
dethroning Nabunagir. Doubtless he could have done so,
for Nabunagir was in no position to offer effective resist-
ance, but such a step would have caused Tiglath Pileser
great embarrassment. To make his coronation legitimate,
THE SOUTHERN AND WESTERN FRONTIERS 21
he would then have been compelled to " grasp the hands
of Bel." This, as we shall see below, he was unable to do
at this time, and to have omitted that ceremony would
have spelled a capital offence against the priesthood of
Babylon. At home he could afford to antagonize the
priesthood, but he could not risk a similar policy in Babylon.
Unlike their compeers in the north, the Babylonian priests
were at this time normally powerful in the political affairs
of their country. Their influence was also .strongly felt
in Assyria. The Assyrians, although they had very re-
cently participated in a revolution against their own priest-
hood, had no feeling of antipathy to the priests of Babylon.
On the contrary, the religious influence of Babylon over
Assyria was never really enfeebled during the entire period
of Assyrian supremacy. It was very strong at this time.
Had Tiglath Pileser crowned himself king of Babylon
without " grasping the hands of Bel," he would not only
have been looked upon as a sacrilegious despot by the people
of the South, but also by his own countrymen, and he would
have earned the enmity of a proud vassal state whose
sense of independence was strong in addition to the
opposition of a large part of Assyrian society. If on the
other hand, in 745, he had submitted to priestly corona-
tion, he might have gained power and popularity at home
and in the South, but such added popularity would have been
short-lived, especially in Babylonia, for the ceremony of
"grasping the hands of Bel" had to be repeated annually
in the city of Babylon. To have missed it only once would
have invalidated his sovereignty. Had he attempted de-
spite the omission to retain the crown, the feelings of the
priesthood and of all Babylonians would have been out-
raged, and in their eyes Tiglath Pileser would have
22 TIGLATH PILESER III
ranked as a ruthless tyrant trampling the rights and
cherished convictions of his subjects under foot. He
would have provided for himself a tireless enemy at
his very gates and endangered his great plans. In
the years to come all his campaigns would have to be
arranged with a view to being present in Babylon for
the imperative annual ceremony. A king whose future
operations were already mapped out, and who in accord-
ance with them would have to travel as far afield as
Urartu, or even the Caspian Sea on the north and the Medi-
terranean on the west, had to postpone the assumption
of full kingship over Babylon until such a time as his
farthest provinces were enduringly bound to the Empire,
and his governors and lieutenants had learned, under his
own tuition, how to hold the king's possessions by the aid
of the system which the crown intended to inaugurate.
His purpose in this campaign ^ was, then, not to sub-
jugate Babylon, but to prevent its falling into the hands of
the Arameans and Chaldeans. These tribes^ were his first
concern, since to leave them unmolested might at some
future time have occasioned serious obstacles to the full
prosecution of any distant expedition in which he might
2 The account of this campaigu is given in Ann. 1-7 (Lay. 68).
Schrader, Kritik, on the basis of a comparison between Lay. 50 B,
lines 5-6, and Lay. 67 A, line 5, assigns the campaign to the 18th
and 19th palii, i.e. 733-732. This assignment Rost (vol. I. p. V) rightly
rejects. Ann. 1-7 belong to 745, because the continuation of this record
(Lay. 34 B) tells of the conquest of Dur-Kurigalzu and Sippar., which
[ct. Ann. 12) occurred in the first paZS or regnal year.
3 Th. A. 5-9 mentions all these tribes. Also Sargon, Prism, I, 41-46
and V, 36-38 ; and Khorsabad, 18-19 (of. 126-127) gives the following
order from west to east. Tu' Bu-bu\ Ha-ri-lum, Kal-(?ydu-du, Ham-
ra-nu, U-bu-lnm, Bua, LV-(ta)-ta-ai sa a-ah Su-rap-pi UJc-ni-i, Gam-
bu-u, Hi-in-da-ru, Pu-qu-du. For Btia, Glaser {Skizze, 189) thinks of
''Biu.'^ Cf. Gen. xi. 19.
THE SOUTHERN AND WESTERN FRONTIERS 23
happen to be engaged; and it is conceivable that while
he was in the far West they might even seriously threaten
Assyria. Later on he had to wage strenuous war with the
Chaldeans, and their power is shown by the fact that, even
when he did get an opportunity to devote his undivided
attention to them, they were strong enough to hold Sapia,
their capital, against every exertion of Tiglath Pileser, al-
though at that time (733) his troops were veterans, and
he a mighty conqueror with a long record of brilliant vic-
tories.
Now, in 745, these Aramean and Chaldean tribes had
come within striking distance of Babylon. A branch of
these two tribes on the east of the Tigris was nomadic,
but the most dangerous although not the more numerous
sections had possessed themselves of several important
cities on the right bank of the Euphrates, any one of
which might be used as a base of operations for an attack
upon Babylon. That city once in their hands, they w^ould
have been in a position to threaten Assyria itself. March-
ing directly south, Tiglath Pileser attacks and takes in
order the cities which were held by his enemies. These
were (cf. Ann. 12 ff. and Th. A. 11), Dur-Kuriijalzu,'^
Sippar, Fazitu, Fahhaz, Nippur, Babylon, Borsippa,^
Kutu,^ Kis,^ Dilhat, and Uruk.^ He drove the Aramean
* Ruins of Akar-Kuf ; so Paradies, pp. 207 f . But more probably
Til-Nimrud, west of Bagdad ou the Nahr Ifa, where Sir H. Rawlinsoa
found a brick marked " Dur KurigalzuV
5 Barsip. Its god was Nebo and his temple was called E-zida. The
Talmud (Ab. Zar. XI. b) reads, "-Beth N'bo d'Bursi."'
6 Cf. Parodies, p. 217. The ruins of Til-Ibrahim a little west of
Babylon. The location is made certain by the reference in the Nabuna'id
Chronicle, Col. HI. 10 f.
" J. Jensen, ZA. XV. pp. 211 ff., in a very painstaking investiiTation,
distinguishes three different cities named Kil One in the extreme south
24 TIGLATH PILESER III
tribes from the banks of the Lower Zab to the banks of
the Uknu River.^ He redug the Patti-Canal, and on the
of Babylonia. This cannot be the city mentioned for the year 745, since
in the campaign of that year TP. went no farther south than Nippur. A
second Kis lay in northern Babylonia near Bagdad, east of the Euphrates.
A third Kis is always mentioned as a neighboring city of Qarsagkalama,
in a hill district on the road between Assur and Babylon. Its name is
always written Kis or Ki-su. Which of the two last named cities is the
Kis captured by TP. ? I think we may eliminate the Kis near Bagdad.
Had TP. conquered two cities named Kis, he would have distinguished
between them. That he dealt with the one near Harsagkalama we may
confidently assume, because at :garsagkalama (cf. PI. I. 16) he offered
sacrifices to Nergal. IT. E. 50, 13, mentions a temple at that place, ^ar-
sagkalama means, ^^ mount of the lancV Thus ffarsagkalama, and its
near by city Ki^, lay in a hilly district. Since there are no hills between
the Tigris and the Euphrates, it is, I think, evident that we must look for
the Kis we are seeking ea.st of the Tigris. If this be correct, then the
Kis placed by Winckler {Hist, map) between the Tigris and the Euphrates
is not the city which TP. took. And again, if our Kis lay east of the
Tigris, then TP., marching south from Kalah, got as far south as Nippur,
and returning north from there, crossed the Tigris, and, whUe homeward
bound, took Kis and Qarsagkalama. This explains why he, after review-
ing (PI. I. 16) the accomplishments of the campaign, sacrificed at har-
sagkalama. It was the last city he took, hence he there celebrated his
victory over the conquered tribes by offerings to the gods.
8 i.e. Warka ; cf. Jensen, ZA. XV. 211.
9 When the Uknu is mentioned with the Tigris and| the Surapi it is
always in the following order : Tigris, Surapi, Uknu. This order points
from west to east. But if, as has been proved {Parodies, p. 195), the
Uknu is the modern Kercha, then the question arises what modern river
is the same as the ancient] Surapi? For there is no river between the
Tigris and the Kercha. Delitzsch thinks of a canal corresponding to the
modern Umm-el- Jemel. But this canal is west of the Tigris, and the order
should then be: Sxirapi, Tigris, Uknu. The probable solution (cf. Bil-
lerbeck, Mitthl. Vorderas. Gesellschaft, 1898, pp. 81 f.) is that the course
of the Tigris has changed since Assyrian times. Its course then corre-
sponded to that of the Shatt-el-Hai, and what was then known as the
Surapi is our present lower Tigris, which was the channel into which
poured the various small rivers rising in the Pushti-Kuh, and which
pursued the course of the modern Shatt-el 'Arab to the Persian Gulf.
De Goeje, ZDMG. vol, XXXIX. p. 8, thinks that the Uknu may be the
Sura Canal.
THE SOUTHERN AND WESTERN FRONTIERS 25
site of '' Til-Kamri which is called IJumuV he built a
fortified city, to which he gave the name Kar-AVsnr; also
a second city the name of which was written at the end of
Annals, line 21, but which has been broken away. Rost
thinks it may have been Bur-Tukulti-apil-isarra. These
two cities became the central garrison-posts of the con-
quered districts, where he settled his lieutenants, having
put the territory under the jurisdiction of the two neigh-
boring provinces of Barhazia and Mazamua}^ The lieuten-
ants had not only to raise sufficient revenues for the
purposes of military occupation, but had also to deliver a
considerable sum to the imperial treasury, since their an-
nual assessment was fixed at the large sum of ten talents
of gold and one thousand talents of silver, besides tribute
in cattle and other goods. From E-sagila, JE-zida^ and
E-Utlam the priests brought gifts ^^ as tokens of their sub-
mission to the conqueror.
With the completion of his first conquest Tiglath Pileser
began to put into practice his policy of colonization. The
conquered peoples were scattered and their lands repeopled
with colonists from Mazamua and Barhazia. His object
was of course to obviate future opportunities for conspiracy
10 Rost, vol. I. p. 7, n. 1. A comparison of line 50 of the Annala of
Shalm. II, with his Monolith Inscription, Col. II, 75, shows that the
country was interchangeably called Mazamua and Zamua ; its capital waa
probably Zamri (cf. Annals ofAsrh. II. 61, 62) . Rost (vol. I. p. 5) trans-
lates, "Ba-ar-ha-zi-ia, pan pihat (m<it) Ma-za-mu-a'' (Ann. 17), " der
Provinz Barhaza, Mazamua.'' Billerbeck (.S"i</»i. p. 72) leaves out the
comma between the two names, and taking them together makes of them
the designation of a district in Mazamua, called Barhazia. TP. felt him-
self secure in the possession of this district from the very beginning of hia
reign, since he annexed the conquered territory to it. It must, therefore,
have been situated near the Assyrian border.
11 The bringing of rihati = ' gifts' (Rost, p. 127), not only symbolized
submission, but was in itself a priestly sanction of TP.'s coronation.
26 TIGLATH PILESER III
or revolution, and he rendered the subjugated tribes im-
potent, both by garrisoning their land and by scattering
them in widely different colonies, thereby preventing the
possibility of concerted action on their part.
But, although in this campaign he penetrated as far as
Nipjjur in the south and had subjugated the country all
the way to the foothills of Elam, clearing the plains and
river basins of hostile tribes, his work would eventually
have gone for nought, had he not penetrated to the hill-
tribes in their mountain fastnesses in the country beyond.
To have left these unmolested must have invalidated his
exertions in the lowlands. From the highlands an uncon-
quered enemy could have descended into the plains to undo
all the victorious results of the first campaign.
To make Assyria secure, and to settle matters on his
immediate southern frontier and his eastern borders, he
undertook in the following year (744) his second expe-
dition, that against Namri.^
However, the southern frontier could not be considered
safe until the passes east of the Diala had been secured.
Their occupation and fortification would serve the double
purpose of a defensive border outpost, and in case of any
future advance into the country beyond, the roads would
be clear for any invasion he might contemplate. Not only
is it probable that Tiglath Pileser divided his army into
two corps for this campaign, but in all likelihood one of
these corps moved in at least two columns. One corps
12 Kamri used to be read " Zimri ' ' (cf . Smith, " Assyrian Cauon, ' ' p. 64) .
Misled by this reading, Delitzsch (Paradies, p. 237) refers to the Zimri
of Jer. XXV. 25. Rest (vol. I. p. xvi. n. 1) believes that the designation
Namri may have been a general term for " East." This \?ould be due to
a popular etymology which derived Namri from namUru, ' to be or to
become light, to shine,' and is probably incorrect.
THE SOUTHERN AND WESTERN FRONTIERS 27
operated to the south. Starting from a point not far north
of modern Bakuba, it followed a course generally parallel
to the east bank of the Diala and presumably crossed the
divide where one of the branches of the Konchitum River
breaks through the hills, not far from modern Imam-Esker;
proceeding east they overran Urinziasu,^^ Bit-ffamban^
Bit-Sumurzu,^^ Bit-Barrua, Bit-Zuahas, and then Ari-
arma,^^ Tarsarranihu, and Saksukni.
The northern corps under the provincial governor
Assur-danin-ani, had the task of subjugating the " mighty
Medes." They succeeded in conquering so extensive a
territory that it is more than probable that they operated
in at least two separate columns. But XkxQ AnnaU give us
little aid in tracing their respective routes. It Ls probable,
however, that they did not divide forces until they had
reached the plain of the Shehrizor. This, so far as the
nature of the country is concerned, they could have en-
tered most easily by marching along the west bank of the
13 This locality is to be sought northwest of Kizilrobat. After conquer-
ing the three countries, Erinziasu, Eit-I^amhan, and Bit-Sumurzu, TP.
could write {Ann. 49) : " / smote them to the borders of Assur.'' His aim
was to control the mountain passes of these countries. They gave access
to the more distant East, and prepared the way for the campaign of 737,
"to Media."
1* In the Annals, Bit-Sumursu is mentioned alone. In the other
inscriptions, it is always coupled with Blt-Barriia, the country which was
immediately to the north of it, and which lay in the neighborhood of the
modern Kamiran. Streck, ZA. XV. p. 325, locates Bit-ffamban east of the
Diala between Bakuba and Mendeli. This is surely too far south. It was
probably north of Kizilrobat in the vicinity of Saripul. in the hill country
through which the boundarj- line between Suleimania and the southern
part of Ardelan runs.
15 Ariarma, Tarsarranihu, and Saksukni are mentioned in that order
in Ann. 56 and Th. A, 31. Blt-Sumurzu (together with £»sn/s) corre-
spond to modern Azerbaijan; and Ariarvxa, which is mentioned alter
Bustus in PI. II. 22, is to be located in Southern Azerbaijan and Northern
Ardelan, and Tarsarranihu and Saksukni in Southwestern Khamseb.
28 TIGLATH PILESER III
Diala, south of the Segrime Dagh, and continuing parallel
to the Shirwan, a branch of the Diala. At some point
which commanded the various roads into Media, perhaps
near modern Behistun, they separated. One division,
going northwest, overran Bit-Ahdadani ^^ and Bit-Zatti,
then turning to the northeast, on the right flank of their
former route, they defeated the troops of Bit- Tazzaki.'^'
The second division, starting in the direction of the south-
east, overcame Bit-Istar, and thence going south, carried
its victorious arms through Bit-Sangihutti ^^ and Bit-Sangi.
A half turn round towards the north brought them to Bit-
Kapsi and finally still further north to Arazias and Par-
sua.^^ The two divisions had together traced an almost
complete circle, and now probably reunited their forces at
the appointed rendezvous. Most likely this was their
point of departure near Behistun. Here it seems was the
site of Nikur^ the fortress which in Annals 28 was re-
corded as having been destroj^ed. It was rebuilt as a
16 The Eamman-Nirari Inscription from Ralah (KBA p. 191, lines 8-9)
reads, Mu-un-a Par-su-a Al-ldb-ri-a Ah-da-da-na Xa--ri ana pat gim-
ri-su. A comparison with a passage in Sargon {Annals, Botta, 73, 7),
which reads, "Al-lab-ri-a Ma-an-na-ai Ur-ar-tu,^^ shows that Allahria
was situated between Parsua and Mannai to the east of Lake Urimia,
and Abdadana east of Allahria, perhaps in the district around Kuh-
Karawal.
1" Bit-Tazzaki and Bit-Kapsi are Median districts {Ann. 26 and
Th. A. 29 f. 34 f.), stretching from eastern Mazamua northward to Lake
Urumia. Their location will depend on the location of Zakruti, with
which they are twice mentioned ( TJi. A. 30, 36 and PI. 1. 18). If Zakruti
was, as is probable, in the vicinity of the Pundsch-Ali, then Bit-Kapsi
lay between it and the Talvautu-Dagh.
18 East of modem Sinna.
19 East and southeast of Lake Urumia. Together with JBustus it cov-
ered modem Azerbaijan.
^ Near Behistuan. The reading is not certain; it may be " Sal-lat.''^
Cf. Br. pp. 231 and 309.
THE SOUTHERN AND WESTERN FRONTIERS 29
strategic base, to control the whole country which had been
overrun by both corps. Here a large number of people
from the various conquered tribes were settled and a
provincial governor was placed over them, while others
from the north were colonized in Bit-Sumurzu and Bxt-
Hamhan, and still others in Zakruti. Before arriving at
Nikur, the two corps had effected a junction, possibly in
Arazias,^^ which they may have conquered together.
Whethev AraJcuttu^ and Nisai were also reached in this year
cannot be determined.^ Neither is mentioned in the An-
nals. More probably their turn did not come until 737, when
a second war was waged in the regions here considered.
The booty yield of the campaign must 'have been enor-
mous. Horses, mules, large and small cattle, camels,
weapons, precious metals and stones, and all manner of
21 Rost's emendation for Arazi. Location probably just west of Divan-
dere ; cf. Sulm. p. 34.
22 Fr. Lenormant {Sur la campagne de Tiglath Phalazar II dans
VAriane, in ZA. 1870, pp. 48 ff. and 69-71) thinks that the presence of
such names as Nisai, Arakutti, Ariarma, and Zakruti shows that TP.
penetrated into Ariana and Arachosia. But Delattre (Le Peuple et la
Langue des 3IMes, pp. 85 f.) has disproved that hypothesis. Rost (vol.
I. p. vi. n. 1) suggests that since TP. did not penetrate into farther Media,
the presence of the names may be due to the fact that some Iranian tribes
did at one time press westward, and then later, because of numerous
migrations of different races into Media, they returned to the East.
TP.'s claim to have conquered these tribes bearing Iranian names, may
be only the record of a tribute which they were forced to pay liiiu
temporarily.
23 The following places mentioned in this campaign are not recorded in
any other Assyrian inscriptions: Sanastiku, IJar'su, {Iirsai, luskitara,
Aiubak, Tutasdi, Kusianas. The lines, Ann. 51-58, are not meant to
convey the idea that the cities and princes recorded in tliem were over-
come after the faU of Bit-ffamban. They are a summary of the re.sulw
of the campaign (lines 20-50), and are not to be regarded as chronological ;
i.e. the cities and lands mentioned are all to be sought in any of the lands
conquered during 744.
30 TIGLATH PILESER III
products were carried away as trophies and as profit. A
tribute of 300 talents of " uknu stone" (lapis lazuli) and 500
talents of silver ^ was imposed, and 65,000 prisoners were
deported for colonization in other dependencies.
The nearest foes were now helpless. At the end of two
years' reign enough tribute and booty must have been
brought into Assyria to satisfy even a people whose previous
supply for some years had been a minimum. Tiglath
Pileser had undoubtedly made his position so strong that
for the future his campaigns might carry him to great dis-
tances without his having to fear that any revolution at
home would seriously threaten his crown. These first
two expeditions had proved brilliantly successful. The
usurper had justified all prophecies as to his powers.
Whole districts were in ashes. Old fortified towns, which
had become a menace, were destroyed. Powerful enemies
had been terrified by the sight of heaps of their slain and
wounded, and were taught to understand what the future
held in store for Assyria's foes. At important points
Tiglath Pileser had erected ' ealam sarrutia,^ ' images of
my royalty.' Much booty was dedicated to the god Assur,
and his terror was ever before the eyes of the smitten
peoples (Th. A. 40).
Although not all the conquered districts were formally
incorporated into the Empire, Tiglath Pileser had, in 744,
begun the real work of assimilation and amalgamation.
These eastern tribes were mostly Iranian and Kassite.
The last had at one time established a dynasty of thirty-
six kings in Babylon,^^ and as late as 702, Sennacherib ^ had
2* Ann. 53 is broken ; but surely the tribute could not have amounted
to five hundred talents of gold.
25 Cf. Winckler, Hist. pp. 72 f.
2« Tiele, Geschichte, p. 287.
THE SOUTHERN AND WESTERN FRONTIERS 31
found it necessary to suppress them. Their traditions
must have made them cherish a degree of independence so
strong that it proved well-nigh impossible to subdue them
entirely. Perhaps it was because of this close cherishing
of their independent Babylonian identity that Tiglath
Pileser's plan of colonization never really resulted in their
full assimilation, and they may have been the cause of his
campaign of 737.
CHAPTER IV
SYEIA AND THE WEST
The object of the campaign of 743 did not contemplate
direct conflict with Urartu ^ itself. The day for such a vital
move was not yet at hand. The triumph over Median
foes, although decisive, was in no way to be compared with
the struggle which Sardurri III of Urartu was prepared to
wage for supremacy in Asia. He was a foe worthy of the
utmost consideration; nor would he and his people fight
the less furiously and bitterly against Assyria, because the
gage of the coming battle was not some petty principality,
but overlordship of the whole of the northern half of the
continent or perhaps independence itself. There was not
room for two great powers of equal strength and resources
in Asia. Great nations had not yet learned how to live
amicably side by side. Between them there was sure to be
constant conflict until one or the other was either thoroughly
subjugated and rendered dependent upon its conqueror
or was altogether annihilated. To be less powerful than
a neighboring people was in itself a prophecy that inde-
pendence would be shortlived.
As the situation now stood in Asia, either Assyria or
Urartu must expect to bow to the superior prowess of the
1 Urartu is the Assyrian form. Tiie great god of the nation was
flaWis, and the name Haldean is sometimes used ; cf. Olmstead, " Sargon
of Assyria," p. 36, n. 30. C. F. Lehmann h&s shown (Verhandlungen
der Berliner Anthropologischen Gesellschaft, 1900, pp. 34 ff.), that the
Haldeans are the Chaldoi of the Greek and Byzantine writers j not to be
confused with the Kaldi-Cha,\de&ns.
32
SYRIA AND THE WEST 33
other, and the issue might hinge upon the result of a single
engagement. Nor was that issue at all a foregone conclu-
sion. Assyria's glorious tradition was a valuable asset in the
struggle to come, but this great tradition was not by any
means her only weapon. As has been seen, when Tiglath
Pileser III came to the throne, Assyria was in a state of
lethargy, but her fundamental vitality and vigor were not
impaired. It only needed a vigorous, able ruler, with
whom the majority of the nation should be in full accord,
to arouse her to great endeavor. That Tiglath Pileser was
such a man his two previous campaigns clearly indicated ;
but the Urartian, too, had become accustomed to victory,
and not only over petty nations, but over Assyria itself. As
we saw in Chapter II, from the time of Ramman-Nin'iri III,
up to the very date of Tiglath Pileser's coronation, Urartian
power had been steadily increasing. Menuas had measured
strength with Assyria, and both he and his son Argistis
had proved themselves the most aggressive and successful
monarchs of their dynasty. Tiele ^ has made a list of the
most important of the possessions of Menuas, and it in-
cludes the land of the Hittites, Melitene, Man, and Urmedi.
He in his turn bequeathed to his successor, Sardurri III, an
empire the largest part of which had been wrested from
Assyria, and had been among her most valuable possessions.
When Tiglath Pileser came into contact with Sard urn,
Urartian territory had attained its widest extent. Its
northern and northeastern boundary line ran through the
Plains of Alexandrapal ^ and Gokcha Lake (Transcaucasia)
2 Geschichte, p. 215 ; cf. also Sayce, CIV. XXXVIT-XLIV. _
3 See C F. Lehmann, Verhandlungen der Berliner Anthropologischen
Gesellschaft, 1900, p. 33. No account of Urartian history g^oprnrhy,
and culture can afford to overlook the work of Belck and Lcl.mann.
Most of it has been published in the journal referred to.
34 TIGLATH PILESER III
and stretched on the northwest to Hassankala nearErzerum,
Aschgerd, and Delibaba. On the west was the Murad
Tschai, with the furthest outposts at Masgerd north of
Kharput, and at Isoli. On the south its line ran along the
mountain range between Armenia and Mesopotamia, and
on the extreme east, from Gokcha Lake to Ordaklu. Nor
does this large empire seem to have hung together loosely.
The manner in which many of the independent states re-
sisted Tiglath Pileser proves that the Urartian kings had
succeeded to a surprising degree in rendering vassals and
tributaries firm in their fidelity. The determined and
bitter opposition which the Syrian princes offered to the
arms of Tiglath Pileser, compelling him to spend three
years in the West before they could be forced to forswear
their adherence to Sardurri, indicates the large measure of
Urartian mastery over very wide territorial possessions.
Sardurri had also shown his capacity for military
accomplishments. By the year 755 he had conquered
Melitene,^ and by 744 the countries of Taurus and Amanus
were also his. Upon these and the support of Arpad he
could depend in the contest now before him. It is indeed
a matter of wonder that he did not press on to the further
West and conquer both Damascus and Israel. The first
was at this time very weak, and Israel, though apparently
prosperous during the reign of Jeroboam II, was, as Amos
testifies, not inherently strong. The weakness of neigh-
boring kingdoms fully accounts for the outward glory of
Jeroboam's reign; and even this was beginning to fade
during the last years of his life.^ Perhaps Sardurri real-
ized that it was impolitic to attempt further extension of
* Cf Inscriptions of Isoglu, Sayce, JBAS. XVI, pp. 642 ff.
6 Cf. Hosea, i, ii, iii.
SYRLA. AND THE WEST 35
territory at this time, because Tiglath Pileser iiad shown
that he was no weakling. It would suffice the Urartian
king for the time being, if he could only hold his own
against Assyria. Nor was it any part of his plan to push
further west away from his home provinces, and leave
a strong enemy in his rear. He could afford to let the
Assyrian make the first move. This, Tiglath Pileser was
compelled to do. Perhaps one of the secret wishes he
entertained in making his campaign of the previous year
in Armenia and the East was that Sardurri would leave
Van and come south to meet him on neutral ground.
But Sardurri did not stir. To have attempted to march
against Sardurri's capital^ and strike at the very centre
of things would have meant a long trying journey through
snow-bound mountain passes, easy for the Armenian to
defend. For a hazardous attempt of that kind Tiglath
Pileser was not prepared in 744. He dared not risk the
chance of a reverse. In that case the Urartian allies
would have clung all the closer to their allegiance, and it
was with these allies, particularly with the Hittites and
Syrians, that much of Sardurri's power lay.
The most promising plan, therefore, was to strike some-
where in Northern Syria. The tribute and taxes from
this rich part of Asia were essential to Sardurri, and their
threatened loss would not fail to bring him from his
mountain-guarded capital into the plains. Here without
incurring the danger, fatigue, and delay of a long march
around Lake Van, the advantage was with Tiglath Pileser.
Should Sardurri stay at home, he would be the loser,
since that must have amounted to a confession of fear,
6 The name of the capital was Turuspa. It is the classical Thospites.
For the various forms of the name, see Sayce, JJiAS. 1882.
36 TIGLATH PILESER III
and as such have been a moral blow at the influence
of Urartu.
The sources mention ' Agitsi,^ Qummuh, Melid, Sam'al, ^
and G-argum, as the active allies with whom Tiglath
Pileser had to deal. Early in 743 he marched west, and
the Canon entry for that year^*' reads, '''•ina Arpadda,'''' in
the city of Arpad. Nowhere in his inscriptions does
Tiglath Pileser hint of a battle or a siege which secured
to him the possession of the city in this year. There is
no justification, with Rost,^^ to change the preposition
from, "ma," to "a?ia," and on that basis postulate a
situation wherein Tiglath Pileser besieges that city and
was forced to raise the siege when he heard that Sardurri
was coming to the relief of his ally. The Canon distinctly
reads, "iwa Arpadda.'^ But we do not know how he
entered and took possession of it. Tiele ^^ thinks that in
744 Arpad was in possession of Assyria, and that Tiglath
Pileser meant to use it in this campaign as a base of
operations. At any rate, although we do not know how
Tiglath Pileser entered the city, for it was the capital of
Mati'ilu, the strongest ally of Sardurri, we are forced to
admit the fact. While there preparing for operations
against the surrounding small states, the news of Sar-
7 Ann. 60-63. Th. A. 45-46.
^ Bit-Agusi, Schrader, KGF. p. 207, n. Tlie capital was Arpad
(Tel-Erf ad, between Aleppo and Azaz). From Shalm. II, Monolith
II. 24-30 and 82-84, it must be located between the Afrin and the
Euphrates, i.e. with Patin on the west and Eit-Adini beyond the
Euphrates on the east.
9 Its capital was probably at Zinjirli, where the Bar-Rekub inscrip-
tions were found.
i» KB.^ p. 212.
" Vol. I. p. XII, n. 2.
12 Geschichte, p. 219.
SYRIA AND THE WEST 37
durri's approach was announced. From the northeast the
Armenian came through Kilhi and Ulluba, across the
Tigris, and then east of the Euphrates into Qummuh.
He had reached a point between KiUan and Halpi when
Tiglath Pileser appeared, and the rivals joined battle
between the two cities.^^ Sardurri sustained a bad de-
feat. He fled the field on the back of a mare." His
loss was 72,900 men (^AnnaU 66). His baggage-train,
horses, mules, chariots, even his personal ornaments, be-
came the spoil of the victor ; and the servants and skilled
workmen who had followed the armj'^ were made captives.
Yet despite all this the battle was not decisive. A single
victory had not decided the fate of the West, nor was
Sardurri entirely helpless. The picture of a complete
triumph with which the Annals would impress us is not
the full story. The victory must have cost Tiglath
Pileser much of his strength. He was compelled to re-
turn to Nineveh and prepare his forces for another cam-
paign in Syria. The allies were not intimidated because
of Tiglath Pileser's victory. He found them even more
difficult to overcome than Sardurri himself; and this is es-
13 Host, vol. I. pp. XVIII ff. thinks that TP., believing that the prox-
imity of Arpad, which according to him was still in Sardurri's power, was
no place for the battle, crossed the Euphrates south of Til-Barsip, to reach
KiStan and Halpi. After the battle TP. pursued Sardurri to the Eu-
phrates north of Amid, and destroyed Ezzida. This cannot be correct.
In this campaign TP. does not mention crossing the Euphrates before the
battle of ^alpi, and to have raided in ITlluba (as Rost believes) would
have necessitated the crossing of the Tigris, which he would not have
failed to mention had it taken place. What TP. really did was to cross
the Euphrates at the "Bridge" {Ann. 68) after the battle; then he
raided Ezzida.
1* Annals of Sargon, II. 107. This was considered a subject for ridi-
cule ; cf. Belck and Lehmann, Verhandlungen der Berliner Gestlhchaft,
1896, p. 326.
38 TIGLATH PILESER III
pecially true of Mati'ilu of AgHsi.^^ It was he who made
Tiglath Pileser spend three years in Northern Syria,
prosecuting secondary campaigns, but principally en-
deavoring to reduce the city of Arpad. We have seen
that the Canon for 743 records the entrance of Tiglath
Pileser into Arpad. The year 742 tells of another expe-
dition against the same city ; likewise the entry for 741,
adding that it took three years to capture Arpad. As has
been said, in 743 Tiglath Pileser left Arpad to meet Sar-
durri in Qummuh. Thus, if that city only surrendered
to the Assyrian king in 741, it appears that while Tiglath
Pileser was engaged in Kistan, the allies in Syria took
Arpad during his absence. And the great king, ex-
hausted by the all-day battle in Qummuh,^^ could do
nothing more in 743 than capture a few cities in that
land. JEzzida,^"^ Harhisina, and Ququsansu, he sacked after
crossing the Euphrates.
15 This opinion of Tiele is justified by Lehmann, op. cit., 1896, p. 324.
^^ I.e. Eommagene, Schrader, KGF. pp. 129 ff.
1'^ PI. I. 34, puts Ezzida in mtt Enzi. To locate the three cities in the
text we must first locate Enzi. Schrader, KGF. pp. 129 fli., comparing
Shalm. II, Monolith. 92-93, with Lay. 47, 28-33, makes the river Arsa-
nias = the modern Murad Su. He notes (p. 144_) that Samsi-Ramman's
(Col. II. 10-12) marching route brings him to Enzi, and that he can
cross the Arsanias only after traversing that land. Enzi thus lies in the
mountainous district between the Euphrates and the Tigris (upper and
western) and the Murad Su. Streck, ZA. XIII, p. 94, equates Enzi with
the modem Hauzeth, between Palu and Arghane, and identifies it with
Alzi (Shalm. II, Monolith. 42, 45, 46) . Enzi was an Urartian pro\ance,
but Streck's identification is not correct. It is not the same as Alzi.
Enzi bordered on Alzi (Alzis of the CIV. ; so Sayce, JBAS. XIV. p. 398) .
It lay between Palu and Khini, i.e. east of Lake Van, between the
Euphrates and the Murad Su. PI. I. 33, says that m^ Enzi borders on
Qummuh. There Ezzida and the other cities of E7izi must be sought,
east of the Euphrates and southwest of the Murad Su.
Rost, vol. I. p. XX, makes Ezzida, Harhisina, and Ququsansu cities
of Ulluba (.Kilhi) ; but, p. XXVII, he says they are cities around " upper
SYRIA AND THE WEST 39
While Tiglath Pileser was wintering in Nineveh pre-
paring for a resumption of operations in Syria in the fol-
lowing year, Mati'ihi made ready for the inevitable siege
of Arpad. He would have made his peace with Tiglath
Pileser, and had he done so, it is probable that he would
have received reasonable terms. But Sardurri had es-
caped into his own land, and his ally expected him to
gather a new force with which to come to the help of the
beleagured confederates in Syria. When therefore the
Assyrian again appeared before Arpad he faced a very
sturdy opposition. How well Arpad must have prepared
for this siege is evident from the time it required to take
the city. Certainly Tiglath Pileser did * not sit down
idly before the walls and quietly await the starvation of
the city. Expeditions from his armed camp were sent
out in all directions and the allies were carefully watched,
in order to prevent concerted action. When in 740 the
city at last capitulated, all the members of the league
save one were anxious to compound with the victor.
The fate of Mati'ilu was sealed. He lost his throne, and
were the records complete, we should undoubtedly hear
of his execution. Uriarik of Que,!^ Pisiris of Karkaynis,^
Nairi Sea," i.e. Lake Van. These cities were all east of the Euphrates
(PI. I. 33-36). The battle with Sardurri was fought in Qummuh. which
was bounded on the east by the Euphrates ; i.e. the battle was fought
west of that river.
18 Western part of Kilika, from Amanus to Taurus, in the northwest ;
of. Schrader, KFG. pp. 236 ff.
19 The general location is obtainable from Shalm. Monolith. I. pp. 20 ff.
His route from east to west is Adini, Qummuh, Gargum, Sama'l, Gnr-
gamiS, Patin. It was the capital of Hatti (Tiglath Pileser I. col. V.
49; alu GargamiS, Sa mtit Ha-at-ti). It is to be located in the ruins
of Girbas, on the right bank of the Euphrates near Birejik. Cf. Para-
dies, pp. 265 ff.
40 TIGLATH PILESER III
Kustaspi of Qummuh, and Tarhulara of Gargum ^ hurried
to Arpad in person to make peace with Tiglath Pileser
and acknowledge his overlordship. The terms he exacted
were heavy. The Annals, wherein the amount of tribute
was stated, are broken (^Amials 89-90) ; all that remains is
the mention of ivory, elephant skin, purple cloth, lead,
silver, and gold. But the measure of their humiliation
was complete, and they had no desire to prolong resistance.
Had they seen fit to do so, a new leader would have pro-
claimed himself in the person of Tutamu of Unqi.^^ Unqi,
originally only the western edge of Patin, had at this
time gained control of the whole country. ^^ It lay be-
tween the Euphrates and the Orontes rivers, and stretched
north beyond the Afrin. The capital city was Kinalia^
and against it Tiglath Pileser proceeded without delay.
From a passage in Asurb. III. 70-92,^3 we may determine
the route which the army followed. They started from
a point between KarTcemis and Til-Barsip and had to
cross the Afrin before reaching Kinalia. But they first
reach Hazzaz ('Azaz). This being an important city,
there was probably a military road from Karkemis and
Hazzaz, which led to the Afrin River. In later (pre-
Grecian) times, such a road went from Birejik (Zeugma),
a little south of the site of Karkemis to Aintab. After
capturing Hazzaz {Kl. II. 27), Tiglath Pileser dealt
similarly with Arihua (Kl. II. 27), and continuing south
struck the road which comes up from Aleppo, runs a
20 Southwest of SamaU, between the Pyramos and the Sadshur rivers.
21 Unqi = 'AinJc ; cf. Tomkins, "Bab. and Orient. Record," vol. III. p. C,
22 From 812-740 the records are meagre ; during that time the subju-
gation of Patin by Unqi took place.
23 The passage is translated in Winckler, Forsch. 1893, pp. 3 2. and
A'J5.2 106-111.
SYRIA AND THE WEST 41
little south of Hazzaz, and thence tlirough the Syrian
Gates to Beilan and tlie coast. He came to Kinalia after
following this road across the Afrin,^ and took it without
much difficulty. In the course of the attack it was de-
stroyed. This we must infer because in Annah 97 we
are told that it was rebuilt. Unqi was placed under a
provincial governor, and much booty compensated for the
expense and trouble of the campaign. Tutamu forfeited
his life. His fate was a dire warning to all neighboring
princes, and it was lucky for Hiram of Tyre and Kezin
of Damascus that their emissaries had been hastened to
Tiglath Pileser with tokens of submission shortly after
he had reduced Arpad.^^
Tiglath Pileser was not yet finished in the far West,
but it will perhaps be better for us, for the time being, to
disregard the chronological order of his campaigns, and
leave his activities in Ulluha (739), and the expeditions
against Media (737), and Mt. Nal (736), and that against
Urartu (735), for other chapters, and to continue here the
details of his work against Syria, Phoenicia, Philistia,
Israel, and Judah, which occupied him in 738, and again
from 734 to 732 inclusive.
The principal countries of the West which remained
independent of Assyria after Tiglath Pileser's campaign
of 7-10, were Syria, Israel and Judah, Phoenicia and Phi-
listia. With these in his possession the Assyrian king
would have been supreme from the Tigris to the Mediter-
2* Kinalia must therefore be located in southern 'Amk.
25 There is some dispute as to the date of Ann. 77-89. Hommel refers
them to 734, but Rost has assigned them to 740. This is in all probabihty
correct, because the Syrian princes had no occasion to swear allegiance
to TP. in 739, after the Ulluha campaign or, in 736, after the expedition
to Mt. Xal.
42 TIGLATH PILESER HI
ranean Sea. Perhaps he had originally intended to devote
the year 739 to the subjugation of these countries and the
reduction of the entire West. But during that year
trouble broke out among the Nairi peoples and a campaign
had to be undertaken against Ulluha. The uprising in
that country was probably incited by Sardurri. Seeing
that Tiglath Pileser was rapidly becoming master of the
West, the king of Urartu fomented trouble in Ulluba,
hoping thereby to compel his Assyrian rival to hurry back
to the East and thus give the western kings an opportu-
nity to form a league against their conqueror. In this
Sardurri was more than successful. Princes and princi-
palities which had been subdued in 740 rebelled against
the Assyrian yoke. Thus when the work of 739 in Ullu-
ba was completed Tiglath Pileser naturally prepared for
a second western campaign, and accordingly in 738 we
find him once again in Syria. Up to this year Sardurri's
plan of fomenting rebellions against Tiglath Pileser in
one part of Asia while the latter was busy in another, had
been successful. While the Assyrian king was engaged
in the West, rebellions inspired by the Urartian monarch
broke out in the East. And when Tiglath Pileser hurried
East to crush them, Sardurri incited revolts in the West.
It was because of this fact, as we have seen, that Tiglath
Pileser was compelled to operate in Ulluba in 739, instead
of devoting that year to a continuation of the Syrian cam-
paigns of 740. But Tiglath Pileser was too great a con-
queror to be long diverted from his great purpose by such
machinations. With Ulluba conquered he was only one
step nearer to his ultimate goal; viz., the conquest of
Urartu. Nor did Sardurri gain much by the formation
of the new league of western kings with which Tiglath
SYRIA AND THE WEST 43
Pileser had to deal in 738. For the latter defeated the
western confederacy, and when he was ready to come to a
final accounting with Sardurri, it was no longer necessary
for him to do preliminary work in Ulluba, since that coun-
try was already his.
For the Syrian campaign of 738 the Canon makes the
objective point Kullani.^ Its ruler probably played an
important part in the uprising, but the real leader wa.s
Azriau27 of Yaudi.^ Yaudi had been governed by the
26 I.e. Kalneh ; cf. Is. x. 9, and Amos vi. 2, between Arpad and
Hamath.
27 The identity of Az-ri-ia-au of Taudi is a matter of dispute. Among
those who think he is identical with Azariah of Judah, are Schrader, KGF.
pp. 395 S. and KAT.'- pp. 217 ff., and Hommel, Geschicktc, pp. GC2-t>(i3.
Oppert, La Chronique Biblique fixee par les eclipses, des inscriptions cunei-
formes, 1867, pp. 30 ff. and Solomon et ses successeurs, 1877, pp. 1-23,
makes him a son of Tabeel (Is. vii. G). Winckler, Forsch. vol. I. pp. 1 ff,,
presents a series of arguments which put an entirely new face upon the
matter. He argues that the king in question cannot be Azariah of Judah.
In 733-732, Ahaz, king of Judah, was with TP. in Ari)ad. But TP.'s cam-
paign against Azariah took place in 738, so that the years between 734
and 738 must suffice for the end of Azariah's reign and also for the full
and independent reign of Jotham. Although the chronology of Kings is
admittedly artificial, yet the sixteen years ascribed to Jotham (2 K. xv.
33) indicate a fairly long reign. The attempt to get over the difficulty
by assigning the fourteen years' difference as a portion of his rule con-
temporaneous with Azariah, would make him king in 738. And why
is not Jotham, but only Azariah, mentioned in TP. ? Then, too, what is
Azariah doing so far north? Ann. 125-132 gives a list of the XIX dis-
tricts of Hamath which conspired with Azariah against Assyria, and all of
them lay between the Mediterranean and the Orontes, north of Lebanon.
Winckler would solve all difficulties by identifying the Yaridi of the TP.
Inscriptions with a country of the same name mentioned in tlie Zinjirli
Inscriptions (Ausgrabungen in Sendschirli ; in 31ittl. aus d. Orientali-
schen Sammlungen, Kong. Miis. zu Berlin, Heft XI, 1893\ and this
certainly clears up the puzzles concerning the possibility of Azariah's Uk-
ing the field in 739, and of his influence in the far north. Rost (Ann.
105 and 123) reads '■'■ Izriau,'' and suggests that this reading may decide
the question. The change of initials from " A " to " I " he not«8 also in
the names Iskaluna ; Askaluna. The text of 2 K. xiv, 28, which has been
44 TIGLATH PILESER III
house of Panammu of Sarn'ol^ and undoubtedly under that
dynasty had, as a result of the conquest of Arpad, become
attached to Assyria. Now that a new coalition, indepen-
dent of Urartian leadership, proposed to contest supremacy
with Tiglath Pileser, the kingship of Azriau, who was not
of the house of Panammu, points to the overthrow of the
pro-Assyrian party in Yaudi. The confederacy, includ-
ing the "XIX districts of Hamath," was made up of
cities^ and states situated between the Mediterranean and
the Orontes north of Lebanon. It is not probable that Is-
rael or Damascus was actively involved in this uprising,
although it is somewhat surprising that Rezin was not the
prime mover. He had begun about this time to make him-
self felt in Northeastern Syria, and was certainly the most
powerful monarch in that part of the country. His re-
sources were ample for a determined* conflict, as he proved
in 732. Now, he and Menahem^ of Israel hasten to render
tribute as soon as the news of Azriau's defeat reached them,
and all the confederated kings swore fidelity to the great
conqueror. Qummuli^ Tyre^ Que,^i G-ehal^ Karkemis,
relied upon to prove a close connection between Haraath and Israel, is too
corrupt to prove much (cf. Benzinger, Eonige, 1899, pp. 166 ff.). TP.
mentions Az-ri-ia-au only in reference to North Syrian campaigns, so that
the king and his land must be sought in that part of the country.
28 East of 'Amk, north of Antioch, and vrest of the Afrin ; therefore
between Unqi and Sani'al.
29 Its cities, Huzzara, Tai, Tarmanazai, Euhnadara, Haiatirra, and
Sagilhi, are only mentioned in TP.'s Inscriptions. Some of these can be
located with certainty ; Arqa, now the ruins of Til-Arka, south of Nahr
el Kebir. (Jimirra (Gen. x. 18) is now Sumra. It commanded the pas-
sage from the coast to the upper Orontes valley ; cf . Paradies, p. 282.
30 2 K. XV. 19, 20, records an invasion of Pul ; but the Annals are
silent as to this ; it may be that a small force under a lieutenant visited
Samaria.
31 Its capital was Tarzi ; i.e. Tarsus.
32 Now Jebeil.
SYRIA AND THE WEST 45
Hamath,^ Sam'al, Grurgum, Melid, Kask, Tahal^^ Atun^
Tuhan, Istunda, and Husimna, aud even the land of an
Arabian queen, Zabibi, became vassals of Assyria. The
tribute they were obliged to render included money, pre-
cious metals, wood, cloth, camels, horses, and herds of
cattle. The booty was so large that it seems as though
Tiglath Pileser's object was not only to reimburse him-
self for the cost of the campaign, but also to make Middle
and North Syria too poor to dream of the possibility of re-
volt for years to come. With that end in view he also
colonized the territory with settlers from Western Media,
where, while he was occupied with the Syrian league, a
rebellion had arisen. Sardurri, unable to face the Assyr-
ian king on the open field, sought to hamper him by diplo-
macy and intrigue ; for doubtless the uprising among the
Median tribes in this year was due to Urartiau influence.
But if Sardurri thought that Tiglath Pileser would hurry
east and leave the allies in Syria free to throw off the
yoke, he miscalculated. Tiglath Pileser did indeed find
himself compelled to leave Syria after crushing the rebel-
lion, and to postpone the conquest of South Syria, Israel,
and Judah, and the Lebanon region until another time ;
and he had in 737 to proceed against Media itself. But
lie was able to deal with Azriau and his allies in 738, and
subdue them so thoroughly that, when four years later
83 Cf. Paradies, p. 275. Its capital was Amat.'
34 Tabal in Ez. xxrii. 1-3, xxxii. 2G, xxxviii. 2, xxxix. 1, always with
Meshech ; it lay north of the upper Euphrates, and we.st of Erzingun.
The relative location can be ascertained from Sargon, Cyln. 16 (AC.
p 40) • from east to west he places mt-IJamhan, Parana. Mliu. Urartu,
Kasku, Tabal, Muski ; on the east Tabal hordeved on Kikiha ; cf. Es;uh.
Cyln. II, 10-13. "37si {m^tu) Hi-lak-ka {mhtu) Du-'u-a a-Si-bu-ut
hur-§a-ni Sa di-hi {matu) TabaV
46 TIGLATH PILESER III
he traversed their lands, en route to Damascus, they were
harmless to harass him. The revolt on the Babylonian
border was soon checked by the governors of Nairi and
Lullumi,^ who sent about 25,000 prisoners to Tiglath Pi-
leser. He settled them in the cities of Unqi, and then had
thousands of the Hittites scattered throughout the Nairi
lands.
For three years there was peace in the West. On the
surface of things, all the princes who had sworn allegiance
to Tiglath Pileser continued faithful, and he, satisfied that
further operations in that direction could wait until Sar-
durri had been reckoned with, did not return until 734.
For that year, according to the Canon, Philistia was the
objective point. But it would have been strange if the
real trouble had not proceeded from another quarter. In
738 Rezin had hurried to placate Tiglath Pileser with
gifts. ^ But, as has been observed, Damascus was a power-
35 An inscription of one of the kings of this country has come down to
us. It is in double columns and was copied by de Morgan (de Morgan
and Scheil, Becueil, XTV. pp. 100 ff. 1891). The name occurs also in the
form Lidluhi.
36 The tribute list for 738 includes North and Middle Syrian rulers ;
viz., Hamath, Samaria, Phcenicia, i.e. Tyre, and Gubal. In that of 734
Damascus is missing, but new names occur ; viz., Armad (modem Island
of Ruad ; cf. Gen. x. 18), Ammon, Moab, Askalon, Judah, Edom, Gaza.
Both lists have Sam'al. As a contemporaneous document mentioning
TP.'s name, the inscription of Bar-Rekub of Sam'al is worth quoting
(cf. "Winckler, Vorderasiatische Gesellschaft, 1896, p. 198) :
1. I Bar-Rekub,
2. Son of Panammu king of Sam^al,
3. Servant of Tiglath Pileser the lord of the
4. Four quarters of the earth, because of the righteous-
ness of my father and because
5. of my righteousness, my lord Rekub-el seated me
6. and my lord Tiglath Pileser on
7. the throne of my fathers. . . .
Bar-Rekub erected his monument in Taudi instead of Sam^al, where we
SYRIA AND THE WEST 47
ful state. Its position among the Middle and South Syr-
ian kingdoms was a leading one, and some of its earlier
rulers had proved their power, even in conflict with As-
syria itself. Ramman-Nirari, despite his boastful lan-
guage,37 had found its king Mari^* a strong foe; and now
in 73-4 Rezin39 had again succeeded in making his king-
dom of Damascus a state to be reckoned with. No doubt
Tiglath Pileser had his eyes fixed on the countries beyond
Damascus, including Palestine. It is also almost certain
that this great king had planned a future conquest of
Egypt. Damascus was the real obstacle in his way. Cap-
padocia and Que on the north shore of the .Gulf of Iskan-
derun were his ; so was Syria south of Damascus, and
should have expected to find it, perhaps because TP. after the events of
738, gave part of Yaudi to a house of whose loyalty he was sure. It is
surprising that a vassal should express his loyalty so sincerely. The
Biblical references express no such sentiment. A reason may be found in
the following : In Shalm. Monolith. II. 42, the land is (mditu) Sam'al. No
further mention of the land occurs until TP. In his Annals, 152, and in
111. a. 8, it is (alu) Sam'al. Perhaps in the course of the incessant
fighting between the neighboring states, Sam'al had, in the interval
between Shalm. II and TP., been constantly worsted and had found that
in loyalty to TP. lay its only safety. Probably this loyalty was not so
much to Assyria as to TP. himself. A great statesman like TP. under-
stands how to attach a vassal to his person. A glance at the Eponyra
Canon for 681 may convince us. Here Sarn'ol is recorded for the first
time since TP.'s death. Now, however, it is an Eponym and not a mem-
ber of the house of Panammu who governs Sam'al In that year Esarh.
came to the throne. That he dishonored the memory of TP. we know.
Perhaps because the house of Panammu was loyal to TP.'s memory,
Esarh., who treated political foes with the utmost leniency, was suffi-
ciently displeased to end the career of the line of Panammu, and to incor-
porate Sam'al into the empire, placing a governor at its head.
3' Cf. KB.^ p. 191, lines 14 ff.
88 Perhaps this is the Biblical Ben Hadad HI ; cf. Kittel, GeschichU,
vol. II, p. 250, n. 5.
89 This was Rezin n. The first was a contemporary of Solomon, 1 K.
ii. 23.
48 TIGLATH PILESER III
even that together with Israel was already nominally in
his hands, but since Mati'ilu of Arpad had opposed him
for three years, Rezin was prepared to do no less. Why
the Canon makes the principal goal of this year's expe-
dition Philistia^'^ we do not know. The mutilated condi-
tion of the Annals for the two succeeding years compel us to
go to the Biblical sources for a picture of the operations
which follow.
The record of Menahem's tribute (2 K. xv. 19, 20) is
the point of departure. This king came to the throne as
a result of anarcliy in Israel (2 K. xv. 23). His short
reign was unsettled ; and his successor, Pekahiah, was
murdered by Pekah, the captain of the palace guard
(2 K. XV. 29). Anarchy in the north gave Judah her
long-expected opportunity.^^ Alone, in her troubled state,
Israel was in no position to cope with her southern oppo-
nent. She had to invoke outside help, and the logical
ally was Damascus. Pekah called Rezin to his aid, and
the two together laid siege to Jerusalem. Ahaz, who
had only recently come to the throne of Judah, did not
know whither to turn for succor. Isaiah's advice he re-
jected.^ The enemies without the gate had to be repulsed.
Nor did they seem to Ahaz to be as insignificant as " two
tails of a smoking firebrand." Of what good was it to
him that before many years the riches of Damascus and
*» Schrader, KGF. p. 126, believes that " {mnt) PiliStu " stands for a
general designation of the East ; i.e. Philistia and Israel. Rost, vol. I.
p. XXIX. n., is inclined to doubt this very much, since the entries opposite
the Canon dates seem always to state the goal of a campaign. But there
is no way to reconcile such a claim with the positive fact that TP. was,
in 734, mainly engaged vrith Damascus, and that Philistine operations
were only incidental to the main campaign.
41 Judah desired revenge for Israel's victory at Beth Shemesh (2 K. iv.
11). 12 Is. vii. 1 ff.
SYRIA AND THE WEST 49
Israel would (Is. viii. 4) "be carried away before the
eyes of the king of Assyria"? And of what use was
faith in God while Pekah was hammering away at the
gates? "The waters of Shiloh that go slowly" (Is. viii.
6) were not quenching tlie firebrands. It became im-
perative to enlist help from some quarter, and tliere were
but two possibilities, — Egypt or Assyria. Of these two,
Assyria was the logical ally, because Israel had tradition-
ally made alliance with Egypt (Hos. viii. 12). Ahaz
appealed to Tiglath Pileser, since from him he could ex-
pect more consideration than from Pharaoh. " I am tliy
servant and thy son ; come up and save me out of the
hands of the king of Syria and out of the hands of the
king of Israel" (2 K. xvi. 7). No second invitation
was needed. Menahem had already paid tribute, but now
Tiglath Pileser had an excuse to overrun the country.
He came, but had no need to proceed against Samaria
or against Damascus as yet. Ahaz had invoked his aid,
but the Assyrian had his own plans. En route to Jeru-
salem there were other lands to conquer. Moreover, Rezin
and Pekah went each his own way ; the one to Samaria,
the other to Damascus.
Probably taking the usual route through the Lebanon
depression in the Orontes valley, Tiglath Pileser made
several Phoenician cities tributary, and an expedition into
Philistia under one of his generals succeeded in subduing
that land. Hanno of Gaza, not daring to resist and unwill-
ing to surrender, fled to Egypt.^ We may see from this
*3 The Mucri {Kl. I. 1, 9) referred to here cannot be an Arabian
or an Idumean people, despite Winckler's suggestive contention, in I'nter-
sucfiungen, pp. 168 ff., and Mitteilungen des Vorderasiatische Gesellschqft,
vols. I and IV, " Murji, Melucha und J/a'm." We must remember
that Egypt was the only power strong enough to dispute Assyria's progreas
'50 TIGLATH PILESER III
circumstance that the eye of Egypt was upon current
events. Egypt was never safe without outposts in Syria
and never failed, when possible, to secure and hold these.
Tiglath Pileser was working his way rapidly into the
zone where every advance step must have caused appre-
hension to the Pharaoh. The latter probably had promised
aid to Hanno, as he had often done with Israel and Judah ;
for it was very necessary for him to keep a buffer between
himself and Assyria, but he failed to keep his promise.
Gaza's independence was important to Egypt, for it was'
the nearest city on the trade route between Egypt and
Syria, and controlled this route. With Hanno a fugitive,
Gaza fell into Tiglath Pileser's hands. He now pro-
ceeded to deal with Pekah. On the western borders of
Israel (2 K. xv. 29), " The king of Assyria took Ijon,
and Abel-beth-maacah, and Janoah and Kedesh and Hazor
and Gilead and Galilee and all the land of Naphthali, and
he carried them captives into Assyria."** Pekah must
have resisted valiantly, and the losses of Israel would
doubtless have been greater but for the presence of a
pro-Assyrian party. Pekah's folly in allying himself with
Rezin and thus becoming the indirect cause of Assyrian
at this time. It was, therefore, to Pharaoh that Hanpo fled. Without
the prospect of Egyptian aid, he would have followed the course of his
neighbors and have paid tribute to TP. Pharaoh did not actually help
him until 726, for in that year we find him in the field against Sargon.
** Kl. I. lines 6-18. The text is badly mutilated. In line 6, Post fills
out, Gal(za). To fill out the lacuna after " Gal,^^ it has been proposed
to read Ga-al-lil, i.e. " Galilee" ; that would agree v.lth the text of 2 K.
Schrader, after the second " (alu) " in the line reads, Ahel-heth-Ma-khah,
which again would agree with Kings ; but Post correctly insists upon the
reading, A-bi-il-ak-k(a). The gap at the beginning of line 7, which pre-
cedes . . . li, Hommel fills out with {Nap-ta)-li, i.e. Naphthali : again
with geographical justification only.
SYRIA AND THE WEST 51
intervention, probably accounts for his murder*^ (2 K.
XV. 30). The new king, Hosea, certainly the leader of
the pro-Assyrian party, was allowed by Tiglath Pileser to
retain his throne as a tributary. That he swore fidelity
to Assyria we see from 2 K. xvii. 3, 4. There we are
told that Shalmaneser "found conspiracy" in him, . . .
"for he had sent messengers to So, king of Egypt."
Tiglath Pileser was now free to deal with Damascus.
Assyria and Syria had met on the battle-field in past times,
and both had registered victories, but Rezin seems to have
lacked both the ability and the prudence of his predeces-
sors. It is not clear why he separated froixi Pekah instead
of remaining with him to face the common foe. Perliaps
Rezin feared that should the battle take place in Israel,
Tiglath Pileser had a sufficient force to send troops against
Damascus while he himself was busy helping to defend
Israel. Such an expedition was actually sent against
Philistia, while the main army was engaged in Western
Israel. Also Rezin had other allies. That he may have
considered it better policy to keep Tiglath Pileser busy in
Israel, west of Anti-Lebanon, and cause him to weaken his
forces in fighting Pekah, so that he himself could gain
time to form a new confederacy, is possible. Perhaps in
his view that was a wiser course than to trust to the issue
of a single battle.
The Syrian proved as difficult to overcome as Sardurri,
but the latter at least saved his capital. Rezin after a
long siege had to surrender his royal city, but not until
his outlying dominion was ravaged from one end to tiie
other, and its cities, towns, and hamlets sacked. Rezin
« Ann. 228, and Kl. I. 17. TP. tells only of Pekah's flight, not of
his death.
52 TIGLATH PILESER III
himself suffered death. ^ The inhabitants of Damascus
were transplanted to Kir.*" The districts which were con-
quered in 732 were placed under a provincial governor
with his residence at Damascus.
Metena of Tyre,*^ and Mitinti of Askalon, who had
formed the new coalition with Rezin, lost heavily in tribute,
aud the last, crazed by his misfortunes, was replaced by
his son Rukiptu, as an Assyrian vassal. To add to the
wide extent of the conquest, an Arabian queen, Samsi, who
may have been an active ally of Rezin's, was pursued into
her home country, and after the defeat of her troops, and
the payment of heavy tribute, was allowed to keep her
throne. Many of the Arabian tribes were made tributary,
and of these, one, the Idibi'il,'*^ were stationed to guard and
control the Arabian Mugri.
Now the princes of all the West hastened to do homage to
the conqueror. At Damascus he established a temporary
court, and from far and near came trembling rulers with
*6 The record of Rezin's execution is not in TP. Rawlinson discovered
part of a tablet wliicli recorded it, but tlie tablet was left in Asia and lias
been lost; cf. Schrader, KAT.^ p. 265.
*" Kir is not mentioned in TP.'s records, probably because of their frag-
mentary condition. Hal6vy, Becherches Bihliques, pp. 57-58, locates it in
or near Elam, on the strength of a reference in Is. xxii. 6. Amos i. 5 and
ix. 7 makes it an Aramean city.
*8 The terror with which Tiglath Pileser inspired his foes is shown by
Metena's surrender. No city was better situated to withstand a siege
than Tyre, and TP. could not have taken it without a fleet, any more
than he was able to conquer Turuspa later on.
*^ Cf. Paradies, pp. 301 ff. They were a tribe situated north of the
Dead Sea, toward the Egyptian border. Their location, near to Egypt,
might perhaps justisfy the belief that the Mucri of Ann. 226, filled into
the text by Rost, was Egypt, and their watch upon that country was the
first step taken by TP. towards an invasion of Egypt. Of course TP. did
not live to return to the West aud to undertake a campaign against
Egypt.
SYRIA AND THE WEST 63
promises of loyalty antl with " presents.*' «» The booty
which they were compelled to deliver was enormous.
Only one prince, Uassurmi of Tabal, dared to absent him-
self, and for this presumption he had the humiliation of
seeing a " nobody "^^ placed on his throne.
Assyria was now mistress of Asia, from the Uknu River
to the Philistian coast, in the south, and on the north,
from the Mediterranean to Qummiih. The East, to the
Caspian, had been conquered in 736. Media had been
thoroughly subdued in 737. Urartu had been rendered
harmless in 735. Only the work of freeing Babylonia of
the Chaldeans remained to be done. We may now pro-
ceed to review the campaigns of 737, 736, 735, 731, and
730.
60 When the various kings came to Damascus to render tribute, Ahaz
is simply mentioned amojg the rest, and not as an ally. A proof of the
view TP. took of his call for help. The author of 2 K. xtI. 5-18, makes
a side issue of the trip of Ahaz to Damascus, -whither he went to
swear allegiance to TP. (v. 10). His chief interest lies in the affai'- of tbe
altar which Ahaz saw at Damascus, and the plans of which ho sent to
Urijah the priest, with orders to build a replica. Urijah obeyed, .Tud
Ahaz thought well enough of the work to set the altar in the Temp'c.
Can it be possible that we have in this transaction a hint of oae of thoi
terms imposed by TP., upon Ahaz? For what altar did Ahaz copy?
Surely not the altar of the discredited Rezin, his bitter foe. Is it possible
that TP. not finding it necessary to go to Jerusalem in person, demanded
that Ahaz set up an altar which would be a counterpart of the one before
which the latter bad sworn fealty ? TP.'s custom of setting up (^alam
Sm-rutia, ''images of ray royalty," before conquered towns, will be re-
called. "Was the altar in question a vaiiation of such an image ?
" 27t. B. 15, "wiar la-ma-ma-na.''''
CHAPTER V
MEDIA AND UIIARTU
In 743, TiMatli Pilcscr liad corao into direct conflict with
Sardurri at Jukati in Qumimih, and altliougli victorious,
had been so far crippled by the battle, as to prevent liim
from following up the Urartian Idng. Daring his march
into Qummuh he had lost Arpad, and since that was
the objective point of that year's campaign, he returned to
besiege it in 742. But although Arpad remained for the
time being in the hands of Mati'ilu, its rightful king, and
despite the fact that Sardurri had made his escape, Tiglath
Pileser was not so far exhausted by the battle of Kilta'n,
but that he could cross the Eupliratcs and raid the
cities of Ququsamu, JTarhisina, and Ezzida (^Ann. 77-81).
Plowcvcr, he neither desired at the time nor was he able
to press on nearer to the Urartian capital, and invade
Ulluha and KilJn. Ar^ad had first to be taken and North-
crn Syria to be conquered.
But UUuba and KilJii were tlie objective points in 739.
They had to be in Assyrian hands before Sardurri could
be searched out in his home land, and doubtless the work
of this year was only another step towards the investment
of Van, which was undertaken in 735. The particulars of
the campaign are meagre, for the Anna! record is missing,
and the remaining inscriptions give few details.^ Tlie
1 Tho sources for tho campaign arc, PI. I. 25-20 and PI. II. 41-45,
and Th. A. 43-'14, The cities mentioned cannot bo located.
54
MEDIA AND URARTU 55
Canon furnishes only tho bare announceraont, "to l[IIuba"^
In 831, Shalmaneser II had been compelled to send an ex-
pedition into Ulluba and Kilhi, for tho Urarfians had
already at that time annexed those two countries, and they
had been under the control of Urartu ever since. Now in
739 Tiglath Pileser inaugurates that series of 2ampaigns
which was designed to culminate in a final reckoning with
Sardurri, whom he had from the beginning recogui/ed as
Assyria's most dangerous foe. If ho can conquer Ulluba
and KilJii and so administer them as to keep them loyal, he
wiU not only have destroyed the buffer state which pro-
tected Urartu on the west, but will open a way for his
troops to Sardurri's very door. The brevity of the sources
does not give the impression that great importance was
attached to the accomplishments of the year. We are told
that a city, Assur-iJci-sa, was established, where the cult
of A§§ur was instituted, and where a governor was installed
to administer tho two conquered provinces. In Tlunmir
he erected an image of his royalty. ^
The following year finds Tiglath Pileser again in the
West, and in 737 he was engaged in Media. But in 73G'*
his operations are prosecuted in nearly the same territory
which engaged his attention in 739. At the foot of the
2 The sentence which completes the entry in tho Canon, " (mahazu)
Bir-tu f^ab'ta-at,^' lias caused controversy. PeLser (KB.^ p. 212) trans-
lates, " Die Stadt Birtu wirderobert:' So also Smith (" Assyr. Canon,"
p. G5). Rost, vol. I, p. XII, n. 4, translates, eine Festung xoird gegrlln-
det : by reference to III. 14, 17, he shows that (;ahiVu may be translated
" established." He observes that if the record dealt with the reduction
of a fortress, the Af;syrian3 themselves would not have known which one
was meant unless a name were given.
8 riimmir, probably a small country in the JVal Mountains, perhaps a
semi-dependency of Ulluba. The name, I think, occurs only here.
* The sources for the year are Ann. 177-100 ; and PI. I. 28.
56 TIGLATH PILESER IH
JSfal^ Range were fortresses and natural conformations which
would be of great defensive value to Urartu should Tiglath
Pileser attempt to invade it. Furthermore, the Assyrian
had to possess them in order to feel secure against a raid
by Sardurri into Ulluha.^ At Kiltan Sardurri had suffered
a stinging defeat, and since tlien his best provinces had been
taken from liim. Although ho had not ventured into
open conflict all the while lie was being despoiled, and was
seemingly content to remain quietly at home, he could
not be trusted to remain a passive spectator altogether.
There was no telling what sudden enterprise he might in-
stitute or at what point he might unexpectedly emerge.
Kilhi adjoined Urartu on the southwest, and it was from
that direction that he could most quickly appear. Ho had
to gain only one victory and Tiglath Pileser would have
suffered a setback perbjips .sufficient to hamper his plans for
years. The Urartian was at all times a dangerous enemy
against whom precaution v/as as imperative as active cam-
paigning. All the more therefore did Tiglath Pileser need
to secure the Nal region. To hold it, once JJlliiba and
Killii were in his hands, made the conquest of these lands
complete and the possession of Kairi final.
Tiglath Pileser took the most important cities of the
* Piost, vol. I. p. XXVII, correctly locates the range as the one stretch-
ing south of Lake Van, and separating Uroi'tu on the south from north-
orn Ulluha and Kilhi; identical with the Armenian Taurus. Cf. also
Streck, ZA. XIII., p. 100, who locates it more precisely. lie places
Ulluha on the southwest of Nal^ east of Kirhu, north of Kanari, between
the rivcns Jezidchaneh and Bitlis-T.schai.
<* The cities, none of which can be exactly located, arc {Ann. Ill),
IJista, Ifnrahisina, Barhaz, Tana. Ann. 180-181: Daikansa, Sakka,
Ippa, riinzan.^u, Luqadunsa, Kuda, Phujia, Dania, Daminn^ Ulai,
Lin'ia, A>'r(inia, I'usa. Muqanin and its capital, Ura (Ann. 183), are
not mentioned in any other inscription.
MEDIA AND URARTU 57
district. Ten thousand prisoners were captured, and over
20,000 head of cattle, together with a large number of
mules and horses, made up the profits of the oampaign.
Wliy Tiglath Pilcser did not penetrate Ulluha and Ktlhi
in 739 we do not know; perhaps because of lack of time;
or it may be that only a part of his army was engaged at
the time while he was busy preparing for other campaigns.
Perhaps, too, Sardurri, pursuing his favorite policy, fos-
tered sedition against Assyria in Media, while Tiglath
Pileser was busily engaged in the North and the East.
At any rate, one of the years intervening between the
campaigns of 739 and 736 was spent 'in the East, and the
following one,7 as the Canon has it, was devoted to " (mat)
AA."^ A part of the country subdued in this campaign
' The campaigns of 744 and 737 have been well studied by Billerbeck,
Sulm, pp. 72 ff. The inscriptional sources are Ann. 157-176, P2. I. 17,
PI. II. 19 ; and Th. A. 29-38.
s Rost, vol. I. p. XXV, without hesitation, reads the " (mUt) A. .4."
of the Canon, as Madai, and considers it an abbreviation of ^ad-ai. He
finds convincing confirmation for his reading in Seuiiacberib, CyL A,
Col. II. 30, which reads (m^t) Ai, while the parallel passage in K. 1C74
omits the determinative (mat), and simply reads, Mad-ai. It can, I be-
lieve, be proved that two distinct localities bore the name Madai. One of
these was JJmliaS (cf. Br. 11693), a land east of the Uknu River. This
UmliaS is not the land which TP. knows as Media ; he distinguislics
sharply between them. Ann. 157-158 read, (inUt) Kil-Knpsi {mat) liil-
S(i-nniji {miV) B1t-Taz-.-:(ik-ki (mni) Ma-da-<ii, i.e. J>U-Juipni, etc., in
Media; and (rnUt) BU-7Ai-al-za-aS {m0.t) BU-Ma-at-Ci (^viilt) Umliai :
i.e. Bit-Zualzai, etc., in Umlia.L The hinds mentioned in PL I. 18, to-
gether with Madai, are in Urartu propor or near it. All are in the nortli,
and so also must this Madai be, for PI. 1 is arranged geographically, not
chronologically. Sargon, Prism, Col. IL 30 (KB.^ pp. 89-91), mentions
Madia with Harhar, which was near the Urartian border. Tims we have
(jnaO A. A. in the North and one also in the South. Certainly in tliis
year TP. was engaged with the northern one. Delitzsch made two at-
tempts to locate (mflO A. A., and both are seen to bo correct when
we remember that there were two lands so designated. In Parodies,
p. 247, he said it was the country around (iad) Aja, in Kurdiitan. Tbia
5S TIGLATH PILESER III
had been dealt with in 744. That it had to be reconquered
does not speak well for the thoroughness of the first ex-
pedition, but does not warrant our thinking that the work,
was laxly done at that time. In the first place, Tiglath
Pileser had to contend Avith the machinations of Sardurri,
and no conquest could be considered final until the latter
was thoroughly routed. As in the West and the North,
so here in the East, uprisings were undoubtedly fathered
by him. People who would never have dreamed of throw-
ing off the yoke so soon after having experienced the
power of Assyrian arms, were incited to rebellion by
Urartian persuasion. Then, too, the campaign of 744 was
only Tiglath Pileser's st-^cond one. He had not yet con-
quered a sufficiently large number of peoples to transplant
into these Median and Klamitish districts, thus to impair
the homogeneity of the original population. Tliere were
still enough of the native inhabitants left to allow of con-
certed action. It must also be remembered that in 744
Tighith Pileser's possessions were not yet extensive, and
he had not sufficient land in which to scatter conquered
tribes. Hence the work of 744 had to be repeated.^ The
sphere of operations as located by liillerbeck (^Sulm.
p. 85) was in the valley of the Derund, about Sinna, the
territory between the Pcndsch-Ali and Talvantu-dagh,
and also in the vicinity of Sakkis. Wlietlier, as in the
first campaign in this region, the army moved in one or
more corps, is not to be decided, for we have no hint as to
h the North Media. In Assyr. Oram. p. 18, he eqiuued (inctt) A. A. with
UmliaS.
8 Tlie names which occur both in this campaign and in that of 744 are
Bit'Tazzahlix, rAt-Sanrji, and Bit-Kapsi. Battauu v/as king in Bit-Kapsi
in 74 1. Tn 737 a now king, L'paS, ruled. This change of kings may have
had sometliing to do with the new uprising.
MEDIA AND URARTU 59
the original base of operations, and the various districts
mentioned cannot be located with such exactness as to de-
termine the line of march. The country covered was
very extensive, and perhaps some of the lands mentioned,
especially those already conquered in 7-1-i, were brought
back into control by the invasion of r. few regiments, since
garrison posts had been established in 744. It is not to bo
supposed that the uprising in each district spread over its
entire extent.
At any rate, the country from BiJcni^^ in the far north-
east, to Niqu^ in the southwest, was overrun. Perhaps
iWjw was taken on the return march 'after crossing over
the Pushti-Kuh Mountains. Tiglath Pileser had on his
way south thought it necessary to take Til-Ashir ; and
this he reached, if Aim. 158 gives the actual route
followed, after passing through Bit-Zualzas and Bit-Matti
(the same order is given in PI. I. 17 ; PL II. 19 ; and
Til. A. 29). Til-Ashur and Bit-Istar reveal by their
names that they were originally Assyrian, or were near
enough to Assyria to have been incorporated into the
Empire, or to have at least retained their Assyrian
character. Of course, these names may have been given
them after their conquest.^
10 Demavend ; according to Sacbau, ZA. XTT. p. 57, It is the Sirdara-
Kuh. Demavend is tlie largest mountain of the range (10,400 ft.).
Esarh. IV. 10 describes it as " ^ade ukni," which may mean renowned
because of its marble and alabaster ; but better because of Its shining
appearance, due to a perpetual covering of ice and snow.
" Always "Niqu (vicit) UmUa's.'' Its possession must have been a
matter of importance, lor it lay immediately west of the outlying hills of
the Pushti Kuh and commanded the pa-sses into Elam.
12 From Ann. 170, v.e learn that it was the seat of a Marduk temple
where TP. offered sacrifices. Not only its name makes its location near
the Assyrian border probable, but also the fact that TP. sacrificed thero.
This must have been at the end of the campaign and In celebration of the
60 TIQLATII PILESER III
Some of the conquered tribes, like the Blt-Sangilutti'^
were, as Rost (vol. I. p. XXV) observes, of Babylonian
origin ; others were located on the southwestern border
of Media." At various places in the district conquered,
Tiglath Pileser erected images of his royalty. The spoils
of victory included all those productions in which the
territory abounded, and as usupI Tiglatli Pileser did not
stint his share. Horses, can: -Is, cattle, mules, " without
number I carried away " {TJi,. A, 33). Sixty-five thousand
persons were deported to other dependencies.
From the borders of Urartu on the north and Rhagian
Media ^^ on the northeast, ^^ to the eastern frontiers of
year's achievements. Of course the end of tlie campaign found TP. near
home. For this reason I cannot agree with Billerbeck, Sulm. p. 87, in
locating Til-Assur near Kifraur or GUan. It lay, I think, between Xiqu
and the Diala on the highway into Assyria proper.
" Blt-Sangibutd near Behistun, Sulm. p. 80.
" Among these are the peoples whose name is compounded with the
element '■'■KingV ; y\z., Kingi-Kangi, Kingi-Alhasii. Streck, Z-4. XV.
338, refuses to see in ihe element Kingi any reminiscence of Ki-en-gi =
Semitic Sumer, but suggests a possible connection with the goddess Kingu
of the creation myths. But why Title's (GcschiciUe, p. 231) opinion of
the preservation in these names of iu-fn-£fi = lowlands, i.e. 'land of
reeds,' should be dogmatically rejected I do not see. Rost (vol. I. p.
XXVI) refers to Wincltlcr {.Yittl. d. Bed. Ak. Orient. Ver. 1837, p. 12),
who notes that Kingi me.'.ns 'lowlands' as opposed to mountainous dis-
tricts. This leads hhn to tlie obse^^'a.tion that these lands on the southwest
border of Media were probably largely peopled by a portion of the
Sumerians who left their homes and settled here, rather than accept ili«
yoke of the Semites when these latter overran Masopoumia. See IV.
R. 0, K. 2SC1, line 20, where the Assyrian " ii\a-at-ti " is rendered in
Sumcrion by Ka-nn-ga (ku-Ia-ma), but where Ki-en-gi may also be read.
^5 Delattre, Le Fcu)>le ft V Empire des Mcdes, p. 101, correctly equate*
the legion of IHkni with IMiagian Media.
" On his return march tribute was also received from rilipi. Streck,
ZA. XV. pp. SSO ff., makes it tlia country cast of the Pushti Kuh ; i.e. the
northwestern part of the modern Luristan. In 77i. A. 38, we re-td {mnt)
n-U-pa-ai u hazanatiUa iadi-i kali-sumu a-di (iadu) Bi-ik-ni. Ttia
MKUIA AND URARTU 01
Babylonia and the boundarict of Asiyria proper, TigUUi
Pileser was now undisputed mastor. No enemy wm left
to contest hia supremacy except Sardurri. With him bo
was now ready to deal. There was in fact no other
alternative. Any attempt to penetrate fartlier west than
he had gone in 742-740 and in 738, was not likely to be
completely prosperous as long as Sardurri was left un-
molcHted in the rvar. In the immediate neighborhood of
Urartu and in the stretch of country between Lake Van
and Lake Ururoia on one side, and between Van and
Assyria on the soutli, no VMtals were left to Sardurri
except perhaps in Parsua and Bustus, and thote were
not powerful. The time for Tiglath Pileser to strike at
the centre of Urartian power had come. He was not the
man to delay. In 735 the road led to TuruSpa. Sardurri
had ventured forth only once, and ho had good reason to
remember the consequent defeat at Ktitan. If he would
not come forth to battle a second time, Tiglath Pilooer
must go to him. But it was no easy task ; in fact, no
Assyrian king ever undertook a more anluous one. To
reach TuruSpa, the capital of Urarju, no approach was
feasible, save from the north. On the south the Arjerosh
mountains reached almost to the shores of Lake Van.
The paases were impossible both because of the snow and
the ease ^vith which they could bo defended against an
invading army, nor was the way via the Tigris and the
Bitlis-chai and thonce west along the shore of the lake
easier. The bridle paths along the south shore of the
lake were naturally fitted for opposition to a big army.
From the south and the east the difficulties were also for-
well describ«« that part of Lurlstjm and the country all the way to
Mt. Damavend, which lies a few zxxiles northeast of modem Teheran.
62 TIGLVTII PILESER HI
bidding, for the Khoturdagh Range would have proved
snowy graves for ihc Assyrian soldiers. There were but
two possible routes." One led from the north shore of
Lake Urumia by Tabris and Khoi to Bejazet. Just
before reaching: Bciazet the road turns off southwest to
Lake Van. The second, the one which Tiglath Pileser
took, led across the Murad-Tschai, between Musch and
Manesgard, then through Dajaini, and northward along
the base of the Sipa Dagh, straight to Lake Van and
TuruSpa. Before reaching Turuspa Tiglath Pileser sent
a detachment to Mt. Birdasu, northwest. of Lake Van,
though just what this move was calculated to gain for
him we do not know. The main body of the troops
ravaged Urartu throughout its extent. Cities and villages
were sacked and the country plundered. Sardurri was
cooped up in his hill citadel, where he was safe, but as
far as his eye could reacli, tlie track of the Assyrian army
was marked by a line of fire and heaps of ashes. Turu§pa,
liowever, was impregnable. Tiglath Pileser could not
starve out the garrison without a fleet to cut oil the food
supply that came iiito the citadel by way of the lake.
At the base of the citadel hill Tiglath Pileser set up
the image of his roydty and turned back homeward. Sar-
durri lived, but Urartu's power was dead. RuaS, son of
Sardurri, rebuilt Turr.spa on an even more impregnable
rock, and we find him in conflict with Sargon some years
later, but as far as danger to Assyrian supremacy was
concerned, Urartu could henceforth be safely disregarded.
Assyria had vindicated her right to the mastery of Western
/ oia.
To the west or the south, as occasion might demand
" a. Belck, ZA. IX. p. 350.
MEDL\ AND UILVRTU 63
Tiglath Pileser could now turn his attention without fear
of the foe who had up to 735 obstructed every step. We
have seen how in the following years, 73-4-732, this free-
dom from Sardurri's influence made the western campaign
easy. Now but one foe of account remained. From the
Mediterranean to Mt. Bikni and the Caspian on the north,
and from Judah to farthest Media on the south, Assyria
was supreme. It only remained for Tiglath Pileser to
gain the crown of Babylon, and Assyria would be without
a rival state in Asia Minor.
CHAPTER VII
THE CONQUEST OF BABYLONIA
For Tiglath Pileser III to gain the crown of Babylonia
was to acquire the unique distinction of being the first
Assyrian king to rule simultaneously in both countries.
There can be no doubt that this had been his aim from
the very beginning, and its achievement marks him as the
greatest of Assyrian conquerors. Nor had his ambition
outrun his power to accomplish a wonderful work. Of
all the nations in Western Asia only Babylonia retained a
measure of real autonomy, and of that autonomy the
Babylonians were exceedingly proud and jealous. Tiglath
Pileser, because his vast empire was at peace, might be
prepared to "grasp the hands of Bel." But it is doubt-
ful whether or not the Babylonians would have been
equally anxious to welcome him as their king, had all
been well with them. Perhaps internal trouble would not
have been sufficient excuse for Tiglath Pileser to march
south into Babylon in 729, as he had done in the first
year of his reign. At any rate, he waited until a disrup-
tion of government in Babylonia led to the interference of
the Chaldeans in Babylonian affairs ; and fortune played
into his hands. In 730 Tiglath Pileser was prepared for
any eventuality, for there was no disturbance in any part
1 The sources are PI. I. 13-14 ; Th. A. 15-28 ; Bahyln. King List,
col. IV. lines 5-8 ; Bahyln. Chron. col. I. 17-23 ; cf . above, Chapter I.
p. 6 ; Babyln. Chron. B. Col. I. 1-26, and cf . KB.^ p. 275.
64
THE CONQUEST OF BABYLONIA ^
of his wide realm. Babylon alone was in a ferment.
From 745 and up to his death, Nabunagir had remained
loyal to Tiglath Pileser. But in all probability there al-
ways existed a pro-Babylonian party in Babylon, which
had never ceased to agitate against the overlordship of
Assyria, and had rendered Nabunat^nr's reign precarious.
The fact that Borsippa revolted is significant, for it
was one of the cities captured by Tiglath Pileser in
745.
Nabunagir was succeeded by Nabii-nadin-zir, who, after
a very brief reign, was killed by Nabu-sum-ukin, an
usurper. He was perhaps successful in his usurpation be-
cause the anti- Assyrian party were his Sponsors. Througli-
out all this turmoil of rapid regnal and dynastic change
Tiglath Pileser remained at home, watchful and appar-
ently passive. As long as the strife in Babylonia was
purely domestic he had no urgent need to fear for his own
plans ; but soon the inevitable happened. The Chaldeans,
who never allowed an opportunity of gaining a foothold
in Babylonia to escape them, took advantage of the dis-
turbed conditions of government. Their most powerful
tribe, the Bit-Ammukani, under the leadership of Ukinzir,'
entered Babylon. U kinzir proclaimed himself king. Tig-
lath Pileser's excuse had come. As the suzerain of Baby-
lon, he was her natural protector from foreign foes, and he
could not allow the always dangerous Chaldeans to come
into such threatening proximity to the Assyrian border
line. If no Babylonian could hold the throne, certainly
neither must a Chaldean be permitted to do so.
Tiglath Pileser marches south, his objective point being
Sapia, the capital of Ukinzir and the metropolis of the
« Cf. Chapter I. p. 6. Cf. Esarh. Cyln. H. 42-43 (KB.^ p. 128).
QQ TIGLATH PILESER III
Bit-Ammukani. En route he conquered the Puqudu ^ and
thoroughly subjugated them. Their cities, Hilimmu and
Fillutu, were sacked * and the whole district placed under
a governor whose seat of administration was at Arrapha.^
A large number of the inhabitants of the conquered terri-
tory were transported into Assyria and settled there in
scattered colonies. The Silani people fared even worse.
Nahu-usabsi, their king, was killed, and Sarrabani, his royal
city, ruined, while the cities of Tarhagu and labullu were
added to the number of ash heaps left in the wake of the
destroyer. The whole territory gave up 55,000 prisoners.
Next came the Bit-Saalli. Their king must in some
way have perjured himself {Th. A. 19). He retreated
into his capital, Bdr-IUatai, which he fortified, but to no
3 The Pxiqudu are not mentioned in PI. II. 6, or in Th. A. 13. It is
possible to include them in the list of peoples conquered in 745, but in
view of their having been the most important Aramean tribe, it is strange
that they should not be mentioned in the Annals. Th. A. arranged, of
course, geographically, enumerates the conquests of 745 and 731 together.
I think it best fits the known facts to assign the expedition against the
Puqudu to the latter year. The Puqudu were located on the extreme
eastern borders of Elam. They are the Pekod of Jer. 1. 21. It has been
claimed that the name Pekod in that passage is only symbolical and not
a proper noun, since the term mentioned with it, Merathaim, is certainly
figurative, meaning " double rebellion." But Ez. xxiii. 23 disproves this
claim. There Pekod, Sutu, and Kutu are mentioned in connection with
the Assyrians. Talmud, Hulin, 107 a, mentions a Nahr Peko in the
vicinity of a city called NerS.
* "Whether I-di-bi-ri-i-na is a proper name is in doubt. Rost (vol. I.
p. 57) is undecided. He transliterates the text (Th. A. 13), Sa I-di-bi-
ri-i-na, and in the translation simply repeats the same words ; nor does
he give the word a place in his index of proper names. Schrader, KB.^
33, reads " .?« idi bi-ri-i-na (mahaza) Hi-li-im-mu'''' ; and translates,
"which on the side of the biriina of the city Hilimmu.''^ Strong,
BP. V. p. 121, reads, ".?a idi biri ina Khilummu,'^ translating, "which
(looks) towards the midst of the city of Khilummu.''''
6 Near Tuz-Khurmah ; cf. Scheil in Eec. d. Trav. p. 186.
THE CONQUEST OF BABYLONIA 67
purpose. The city was obliged to surrender, and together
with Amlilatu, rendered up its treasure and contributed its
large quota to the 50,400 prisoners who were parcelled out
into widely distributed settlements. But the city which
Tiglath Pileser was most anxious to take, iSapia, success-
fully resisted every siege device. All its surrounding
country was devastated, but Ukinzir retained his capital,
at least for the time being. To complete the subjugation
of the Chaldeans was impossible while Ukinzir remained
unsubdued, but all the rest of the tribes were made tribu-
tary. Balasu, too, of the Bakkuri,^ sent tokens of submis-
sion; while Merodach Baladan^ of the Bit-Yakin, a. conntry
no king of which had ever done homage to Assyria {T/i.
A. 26), journeyed to Tiglath Pileser's camp while the
latter was besieging Sapia, and rendered his voluntary
tribute of precious metals and the products of his swamp-
land country. To the list of subject princes was added
Nadin of Larrak.^ All that now stood between Tiglath
Pileser and the throne of Babylon, was Ukinzir. To
achieve his ambition, the Bit-Amukkani and their leader
had to be put out of the way. The year 730 Tiglath
Pileser spent at home, preparing for the final campaign.
6 Usually Bit-Dakkuri (Esarh. II. 42) (ma<w) Bit-Dak-kur-i Sa ki-rib
{mottu) Kal-di ai-ah Ba-U-lu ka-mu-u. " Bit-Dakkuri in Chaldca, inimi-
cal to Babylon." West of the Euphrates near Babylon and Borsippa.
It is mentioned together with all the tribes which TP. mentions in 731, in
Sargon, Prunk. 21 (ZB.^ p. 65): §a mi-sir {matu) Elamtu (mStit) Kar-
dunias i-liS u Sap-Us O^atu) BU-Amukka7ii (mcitii) BTU-Dak-kti-ri (md/w)
Bit-Si-la-ni (mcttu) Blt-Sa'al-la si-hir-ti imCitu) Kal-di via-hi-ba-.iu-u,
" In the district of Elam throughout its whole extent ... all of Elam aa
much as it is."
^ The form Berodach Baladan in 2 K. xx. 12 is a textual corruption.
8 Lenormant, La Langue Primitive, p. 34, identifies it with the Ellasar
of Gen. xiv. 1. According to Loftus, " Travels and Researches," p. 256,
it is identical with the ruins of Sankereh.
68 TIGLATH PILESER III
In all likelihood, this interval of preparation was a busy
time in diplomacy and intrigue. Even with Ukinzir out
of the way, there was still an anti-Assyrian party in Baby-
lon, who could be depended upon to resist to the last the
crowning of a foreigner. These pro-Babylonians would
accept Tiglath Pileser's aid in freeing their country of the
Chaldean danger, but would insist on having a native sov-
ereign. How did the always powerful priesthood stand in
the matter ? In 745, while a native king ruled, they had
hailed Tiglath Pileser as king of Assyria, and as such had
brought him gifts for clearing their country of her enemies.
Would they accept him as king of their own land in 729?
To ascertain their attitude with surety Tiglath Pileser
during his stay at home in 730, probably carried on nego-
tiations with the priests. Perhaps the defeat of Ukinzir
was part of the price which the priests exacted in exchange
for any aid they might promise to render to the Assyrian
king, in his efforts to gain the Babylonian crown. Cyrus
in later times probably gained just such an easy access to
Babylon because of a previous compact with the priest-
hood, and it demands no great stretch of the imagination
to think that Tiglath Pileser too had a perfectly clear un-
derstanding with the priestly caste. At any rate in 729 he
proceeded south a second time, and this time his operations
against Sapia were successful. Ukinzir was captured and
of course executed. The way to the throne of Babylon
was now clear. On the New Year's day Tiglath Pileser
III " grasped the hands of Bel," and was crowned under
the name of Pulu. De facto and de jure king of Assyria,
king of Sumer and Akkad, conqueror of Western Asia, a
prince without rival, the usurper of 745 has become the
master of civilization.
THE CONQUEST OF BABYLONIA 69
Great pity it is that the records are mutilated. Were
the sources not so meagre, a fuller knowledge would per-
haps compel us to class Tiglath Pileser III as the equal of
Cyrus, than whom the Eastern Avorld produced no mightier
warrior and administrator. From the Caspian to Egypt,
all of Asia was dependent upon Assyria. No future king
would hold his empire more firmly than Tiglath Pileser
had held it, nor inspire greater respect and fear of his
mighty power. In 728 Tiglath Pileser repeated the cere-
mony of coronation at Babylon, and in 727, in the month
of Tebet, he died. His son, Shalmaneser IV, succeeded
him, but the dynasty was short-lived, ^or Shalmaneser
ruled but five years, and in 722 the stranger Sargon
founded a new line. He, too, was a usurper, his succession
to the throne resulting from a reaction to the tendencies
which had been responsible for the elevation of Tiglath
Pileser. The latter king's reign was only of compara-
tively brief duration, but it sufficed him to make Assyria
strong enough to endure until her cultural work for civili-
zation was finished. In modern eyes that must consti-
tute his chief glory.
During his reign he had time to build but one palace,
and that, as has been noted, was dismantled by Esarhaddon.
But better than a palace, he builded an empire, far-flung,
but w^ell governed and fairly compact, despite the hetero-
geneous elements of which it was composed. The central
problem of Assyrian statecraft was to weld the subject
races and peoples into a homogeneous unit. Such a task
was never fully accomplished, either by Assyria or by any
of the great world powers that succeeded her, but Tiglath
Pileser approximated to it sufliciently well to erect a
structure far more stable than that of any of his prede-
70 TIGLATH PILESER III
cessors and to render Assyria safe until her work was
done.
After he had conquered a territory, he, like his prede-
cessors, placed it under the administrative supervision of
the governor of the immediately adjoining province, or
else made an entirely new province out of it. Tiglath
Pileser's innovation consisted in this : whereas former kings
had colonized a newly acquired land with settlers from
Assyria proper, and had placed portions of the conquered
subjects in scattered colonies throughout Assyria, he kept
his Assyrian subjects at home. His empire was too ex-
tensive to do otherwise. Had he colonized subject lands
with Assyrians he must soon have depleted the native and
homogeneous population of the home country. Instead,
he effected a transfer of subjugated peoples from one de-
pendency to a far distant one. His aim was to keep As-
syria intact and thus to minimize the danger of rebellion
and revolt. He allowed no colony of foreign settlers to be
large enough or near enough to one of their own affiliation
to permit the possibility of any concerted action against
the imperial government. The colonies were so located
that their thought-habit, their customs, their religion, and
even their language made them, if not offensive to their
new neighbors, at least a segregated unit among them.
No collusion, in fact, no bond of sympathy between the old
and the new population was possible. It might even
happen that an uprising on the part of the old settlers
would operate to attach the new colonists more closely to
Assyria. For the first step in a rebellion is generally a
demonstration against the stranger within the gates. In
the event of such demonstrations the new settler would
have no recourse but to appeal to Assyria. He had no
THE CONQUEST OF BABYLOXLV 71
greater love for Assyria than had the strangers among
whom he had been settled, but to feed fat his grudge and
nurse vengeance would in no wise answer his need of self-
preservation. Assyria had to be petitioned for help, and
granting it, came naturally to be regarded as a deliverer.
Thus a measure of real loyalty was secured, and it was
probably in this way that Panammu of Sam'al was rendered
faithful. The Assyrian army was never. so numerous as
to permit large detachments to be stationed at garrison
posts. At most, a governor might have a small company
to aid him in the enforcement of his authority. The
realization that Assyria was ready to back up her officials
might not deter a determined people from revolt. If the
rebellion arose in a district far from Assyria, aid might be
long in coming and the uprising have assumed very serious
proportions before its arrival; but with Tiglath Pileser's
plan in effect there was a colony of strange settlers on the
spot. These had no affiliations with the indigenous pop-
ulation and could readily be pressed into service to aid
the governor until reenforcements arrived. It is more
than probable that this plan of colonization resulted in
furnishing a source of recruiting for the army which ob-
viated too great a drain upon the male portion of Assyrian
population. With only a fair-sized force from liome, a
considerable contingent of vassals could be enlisted en
route to the seat of disturbance, together with a numl^r
of troops from among the foreign colonists in the vicinity.
It was this system of colonization that gave Assyria the
lease of life which she enjoyed. It might even have in-
sured her a longer national existence, had she not been
far too small to hold out against the barbarians who later
on overran Babylonia and put an end to its career. To
72 TIGLATH PILESER III
his high ability as a warrior, and the glory with which he
graced his country's name, there must be ascribed to
Tiglath Pileser III as his greatest credit, that administra-
tive system which conserved the existence of the Empire
until Babylon once again came into her own.
Wednesday, January 22, 2014
words of PUL
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